In
Defense of the Dialectic: Response to Negri[1]
Collective reinterpretation of
revolutionary theory is long overdue, especially after the end of what Paul
Sweezy called the first wave of socialist experimentation. History has revealed
the tragic miscalculations of Lenin, and verified MarxÕs belief that
world-historical transformation of capitalism must occur from within its core.
Antonio Negri's experiences in the 1970s Italian autonomous movement situate
him to pose theoretical insights from the point of view of practical action. As
the movement against capitalist globalization has
gathered momentum, Negri and co-author Michael Hardt seek to theorize the
global revolt against neoliberalism.
While their enthusiasm for the revolt of the multitude is refreshingly unusual among academics, their theories have limited usefulness in building liberatory movements. Although they generally confine themselves to theoretical questions, Negri publicly campaigned for the European constitution in 2005. In the following remarks, I hope to make apparent problems that inhibit these theoristsÕ efficacy: their rejection of dialectical thinking, NegriÕs fetishization of production, and a failure to deal with patriarchal domination.
Negri has been enormously
self-critical and changed many of his views from the 1970s and 1980s, but he
retains ideological categories and patterns of thinking that lead him in the
same directions he now acknowledges as mistaken. Accordingly, just as his mentor Louis Althusser believed Òhistory has no subject,Ó Negri and Hardt
maintain that ÒempireÓ has no single hegemonic country. For them, US
imperialism is a category of limited or no value, since their understanding of
postmodern reality is that the system exists everywhere but in no determinate
place. For them, postmodernism differs radically from the modern epoch, and
since the modern epoch was dialectical, the postmodern one cannot also be.[2]
Their logic is similar to that of Althusser: the
philosophical categories of the young Marx are rejected while the economic
categories of the "mature Marx" are rigidly accepted. Rather than
understanding Marx's later work as an empirical fleshing out of the
philosophical categories developed from Hegel's dialectical method, Negri now
tells us that dialectical thinking is wrong. Nowhere is NegriÕs revision of
Marx more apparent than in his current rooting of ÒcommunistÓ theory in
Machiavelli and Spinoza and in his disavowal of dialectical thought in all its
forms.
Agreeing
with Francis Fukuyama in a critique of Hegel, Hardt and Negri tell us:
History has ended precisely and only to the extent that it is
conceived in Hegelian terms—as the movement of a dialectic of
contradictions, a play of absolute negations and subsumption.[3]
Rejecting a dialectical framework,
they mistake essence and appearance. While the contemporary corporate system
may appear to have flattened out contradictions like colonialism, class
struggle and national exploitation, beneath the surface, these conflicts brew,
ultimately pitting the elite against the multitude in what can only be resolved
through the overthrow of the current categories of everyday life. In place of
patriotism, international solidarity; instead of hierarchy, egalitarianism;
rather than individual accumulation of wealth, collective appropriation of the
vast social riches bequeathed to the living by generations of labor. Such a
dialectical subsumption of the present defies every system of thought that
projects the categories of the present onto the future.
Using the ÒmatureÓ Marx, especially
the Grundrisse, as a master text, Hardt
and Negri mould reality to fit Marx's categories. Marx's own insistence that he
was "not a Marxist" was as much a rejection of such a system
abstracted from historical specificity, as it was a distancing from MarxistsÕ
claims of their infallibility. Marx's last work contains major problems, as he
himself acknowledged when he could not solve the problem of expanded
reproduction in Volume 2 of Capital.[4] Disregarding the problems Marx found in Volume 2, Negri
and Hardt seek to reformulate his work in the context of the Òpostmodern
state-form.Ó With typical modesty, they claim Òfinally to write those two
chapters of Capital that were never written.Ó[5]
However
much they profess to admire Marx and bring his analysis into the postmodern
period, they revise his method in much the same way that the Third
International did: emphasizing materialism, they jettison the dialectic.
Now that we have claimed the end of the concept of a socialist
transition and the notion of a dialectical progression of historical
developmentÉwe have to reconsider our methodological principles and reevaluate
the stock of our theoretical arsenal. Is there, among our weapons, a method for
constructing in separation? Is there a nondialectical theory of the
constitution of collective subjectivity and social relations?[6]
On the same page, they go on to
assert that the tradition of thought from Spinoza to Nietzsche, Foucault and
Deleuze
constitutes an alternative to the dialectic and thus
provides us with an open terrain for alternative political methodology. Against
the negative movement of the dialectic, this tradition presents a positive
process of constitution. The methodology of constitution thus shares with the
methodology of the liberal philosophical tradition a critique of the
dialectical conception of totalityÉ
In the
above remarks, one of his central complaints about the dialectic is its
conception of totality. Earlier in the same book, however, he asserts:
In fact, in the postindustrial era, in the globalization of the
capitalist system, of the factory-society, and in the phase of the triumph of
computerized production, the presence of labor at the center of the life world
and the extension of social cooperation across society becomes total.[7] (my emphasis)
Such
examples of anomaly and inconsistency within the same book are not uncommon in
NegriÕs prose. Another level of the vacillating character of his theory can be
found in his writings from different periods of time. In the 1970s, he was
flush with admiration for Lenin, the diamat notion of base and superstructure,
the dialectical method, and the vanguard party—all of which he now
rejects.
While Hardt and NegriÕs collaboration has been incredibly
productive in output, it, too, lacks consistency. To give one major example,
after September 11, they radically altered their understanding of the
centrality of war to the current system. In their bestselling book, Empire, they had insisted that, ÒThe history of imperialist,
interimperialist and anti-imperialist wars is over. The end of history has
ushered in the reign of peace.Ó
Four years later, i.e. after the second major US war on Iraq, they tell
us (correctly I think) that: ÒThe tradition of tragic drama, from Aeschylus to
Shakespeare, has continually emphasized the interminable and proliferating
nature of war. Today, however, war tends to extend even further, becoming a permanent
social relation.Ó[8]
For
decades, I have written about the shortcomings of Lenin, Soviet Marxism, and
vanguards—but have done so from what I think of as a dialectical
standpoint: from the perspective of the concrete negation of the existing
system by millions of people in popular movements that contest power. The
strikes of May 1968 in France and May 1970 in the US both consisted of the
dialectical transcending of national allegiances through the enacted
international solidarity of millions of people. Simultaneously people negated
hierarchical authority through the lived experiences of self-management. In
Italy in the 1970s and Central Europe in the 1980s, vibrant movements
challenged patterns of authority in everyday life, seeking to overturn
patriarchy and organizing spontaneously into squatted houses, insurrectionary
groups and communes through an Òeros effectÓ of mutually amplified uprisings.
Negri and
HardtÕs history of these periods contains little or no empirical data, and they
ignore such transcendental dynamics. They do not include feminist autonomy in
their schema even though it was an early source of inspiration for the broader
movements.[9]
Now they tell us not only that reality is not dialectical but also that MarxÕs
method was not dialectical. Insisting that Marxism is one stream in the current
of revolutionary thinking, a proposition with which I am in full agreement,
they postulate an undialectical Marxism (an oxymoron in my view) for the
postmodern world.
From
the Fetishization of Production to the Production of Fetish
Negri developed the term
"social factory" to include as "producers" women in the
home and students in schools and a vast number of other people. For Negri, the
"collective work experience" is more than primary; it is the only
real activity of humans. He organizes his own theoretical schema according to
his notion of production, and every arena of interaction is understood through
that prism: "Production and society have become one and the same thing."[10]
Negri's mentor Althusser saw theory as a form of production; Deleuze and
Guattari portray the unconscious as the producer of desire[11];
and now Negri tells us that revolution is a production led by "machines of
struggle."[12] Metaphors
for revolutionary organizations have had interesting formulations: organs of dual power, vehicles for the propulsion of revolutionary consciousness, a transmission
belt of revolutionary ideas to the working
class, and now Negri's "machines of struggle," or better, his new formulation, "cyborg":
The
cyborg is now the only model available for theorizing subjectivity. Bodies
without organs, humans without qualities, cyborgs: these are the subjective
figures today capable of communism.[13]
His choice of words reveals a fetishization of the labor
process; more disturbing is his idea that human beings can be emptied of
qualities that differentiate us from machines. Negri can only think in terms of
this one dimension, so even his political strategy is transformed into a type
of production:
Instead
of new political alliances, we could say just as well: new productive
cooperation. One always returns to the same point, that of
production—production of useful goods, production of communication and of
social solidarity, production of aesthetic universes, production of freedom.
His attempt to analyze all reality from within the
category of production is part of his systematic reduction of life to work, of
the life-world to the system, of eros to production. This is precisely the reduction
of human beings that is made by the existing system. It quite escapes him that
if revolutionary movements in the future were to adopt his categories, they
would be rendered incapable of going beyond the established system. In essence,
Negri makes the whole world into a point of production. In a society
overwhelmed with the fetishization of commodities, is it surprising that
production, the central activity of capitalism, is itself fetishized?
Without a reworking of the psyche
and reinvigoration of the spirit, can there even be talk of revolution? On the
one side, the system colonizes eros, turning love into sex, and sex into
pornography. Labor becomes production, production a job; free time has been
turned into leisure, leisure into vacation; desire has been morphed into
consumerism, fantasy into mediated spectacle. Autonomous movements respond by
rescuing eros from its commodification, expanding its space, moving beyond
patriarchal relationships, beyond conceptions of love solely as physical love.
The politics of eros infuse everyday life with a content that subverts its
would-be colonizers and preserves it as a reservoir of the life-force. The
Òeros effectÓ indicates how social movements are an expression of peopleÕs
loving connectedness with each other. In contrast to Negri's cyborgs, my view
of the role of movement participation is that it preserves and expands the
domain of the heart—of all that is uniquely human, all that stands
opposed to machine culture.
At a time when working people want
to escape the engulfment of their lives by the system, NegriÕs ideas of
revolution do little more than assert the omnipresent character of the system
of production. His postulation of production as the central category from which
to understand life reproduces the very ethos he claims to oppose. Soviet
Marxism's reduction of Marxism from a revolutionary philosophy to the science
of the Party led to the labor metaphysic and the enshrining of production as
the essential defining activity of the proletariat. Labor is just one of
several species-constitutive activities (art, revolution and communication
being others). If unchallenged, the fetishization of one dimension will lead to
a practical inability to sustain a multifaceted movement. Negri and Hardt
insist:
The
world is labor. When Marx posed labor as the substance of human history, then
he erred perhaps not by going too far, but rather by not going far enough.[14]
Here their substitution of labor for revolution is
significant. For Marx, class struggle was the motor force of history. For Negri
and Hardt, Òclass-for-itselfÓ is an irrelevant concept since the dialectic is
dead.
The Centrality of Patriarchy
Negri's fetishization of production
reifies Marx's notion of the working class. In Italy in the 1970s, workerism
was an obstacle to the autonomous movement's unity and progress. NegriÕs
interpretations of the struggles of 1968 and 1977 portray them solely as
workers' movements, ignoring women's struggles and the counterculture as other
sources of autonomous politics.[15]
Although he has today disavowed his workerist politics of the 1970s, he still
understands the vital post-Fordist forces of militant opposition solely as
Òworkers.Ó
In the late 1960s, Italian and
German feminists were compelled by the self-righteous workerism of their male
"comrades" to assert their autonomy from the Left. Following the lead
of African-American activists, US feminists were the first to break with
patriarchal dynamics within the movement, and their leading role is recognized
in both Italy and Germany. The significance of feminism and, in the US,
anti-racist praxis to the subsequent workersÕ and youth movements is noteworthy
and could not possibly be ignored unless one's categories of analysis obstruct
oneÕs capacity for seeing. Feminists spoke in the "I" mode, not on
behalf of others (the "workers" or the "people"), and their
ability to return continually to the reality of their own needs became an
essential feature of autonomous movements. Feminism was exemplary, particularly
in Italy, where, even before the consolidation of Autonomia, women articulated their need for autonomy.[16]
One of the needs of revolutionary
theory today is to understand the centrality of patriarchy. By failing to
incorporate an analysis of patriarchy that treats its forms of domination as
significant alongside capitalist exploitation (and not reduced to the latter),
Negri obviates the urgency of womenÕs liberation. Just as capital has various
phases (primitive, industrial, post-Fordist) so patriarchy has its own history,
which only recently fused with that of capital. Patriarchy has at least two
different forms in history: Originally, the man owned his wife and children and
was entitled to trade them or sell them. Hegel reminded us that fathers in Rome
had the right even to kill their children. In the second form, the wife and
children are not legally owned but they reproduce the legal structure of
domination within their own character structures.[17]
Workerism is a partial
understanding of the universe of freedom. By positing revolution only in terms
of categories of production, Negri constricts human beings and liberation
within the process of production. His mechanical subsumption of all forms of
oppression to the category of work negates the need to abolish patriarchy,
racism and the domination of nature alongside capitalism. His politics are thus
a suppression of universal liberation.
Negri's fetishization of production
is the theoretical equivalent of Soviet suppression of women's issues as
dividing the working class or as, at best, a "secondary
contradiction." His one-dimensionality magically obliterates issues of
sexism within the ranks of the working class. At first glance, his notion of
the Òsocial factoryÓ seems well taken: women, students and other constituencies
have had their everyday lives penetrated by the commodity form and
mechanization. As he recognized in 1990, he was long overdue in understanding
them as a central part of the transformative project. But he understands
feminism as having demonstrated the centrality of the issue of wages, not of
questioning patriarchy. Although patriarchy (and race) need to be understood in
their own right, as autonomously existing, not simply as moments of capital,
Negri's abstract categories impose a false universality.
He collapses all categories of
crisis into a single concept of exploitation, just as he understands all of
society through the prism of production. But his facile incorporation of all
life to that category is problematic. He subsumes the patriarchal domination of
women into the phenomenological form of capital. Patriarchal oppression cannot
be made equivalent to class exploitation, no matter how much the concept of the
social factory is invoked. What occurs between men and women under the name of
patriarchy is not the same as what happens between bosses/owners and workers.
Women's liberation from housework will not occur through the path of
"wages for housework" but through the abolition of housework as
women's domain through the reconstitution of communal households by
associations of cooperating equals who share necessary tasks, eroticize them,
turn them into play.[18]
Neo-Leninist Rectitude
Exacerbating the above problems is many peopleÕs elevation of Negri to an infallible status[19] and Hardt and NegriÕs own assertion of the absolute truth of their theories. Unable to make more than shallow theoretical responses to dialectical thought (particularly Marcuse and New Left thinking), Negri invokes his own rectitude in place of substantive discussion and debate. When referring to Marcuse, for example, Negri scoffs at "humanism" and calls for the "the exclusion of this insipid blubbering from theory."[20]
Negri's system is NOT one in which
a diversity of views is welcomed. Far from it, he continually insists on
enunciating positions as though his correctness were a given, and many Negri
supporters refuse to consider alternative perspectives. They have little use
for a whole range of movement tactics, arrogantly asserting, ÒNonviolent
actions are thus almost completely useless when deprived of media exposure.Ó[21]
My own distance from such ways of thinking is great, since to me, they
represent forces of the dogmatic Left that took over popular organizations like
SDS in both Germany and the US, leading them to irrelevance and dissolution at
the end of the 1960s.
In fairness to Negri, his workerist
politics resolutely opposed the reformism of the Italian Communist Party in the
1970s. By 1989, while retaining his critique of reformism, he and Felix
Guattari wrote that "It is clear that the discourses on workers'
centrality and hegemony are thoroughly defunct and that they cannot serve as a
basis for the organization of new political and productive alliances, or even
simply as a point of reference."[22]
In a self-critical section of a postscript to this same text dated 1989, Negri
acknowledged his failure to understand the "participation of the Soviet
Union in integrated world capitalism." He employs the concept of Gesamtkapital (capital as a whole) that Herbert Marcuse analyzed
as subordinating the particular enterprises in all sectors of the economy to
corporate globalization.[23]
Moving away from his former workerist politics, he also came to consider
intellectual work to be at the "center of production." Together with
Felix Guattari, he thinks he "ought to have noted more clearly the central
importance of the struggles within the schools, throughout the educational
system, in the meanders of social mobility, in the places where the labor force
is formed; and we ought to have developed a wider analysis of the processes of
organization and revolt which were just beginning to surface in those
areas."[24]
In reviewing recent history,
particularly the struggles of 1989, Negri concludes that it was not mainly the
working class or the bureaucracy who revolted, but intellectuals, students,
scientists, and workers linked to advanced technology. "Those who
rebelled, in brief, were the new kinds of producers. A social producer, manager
of his own means of production and capable of supplying both work and
intellectual planning, both innovative activity and a cooperative
socialization."[25]
While he doesn't say so in so many words, he essentially adopts the New Left
idea of the "new working class" formulated by Serge Mallet and
articulated more fully by Andre Gorz and Herbert Marcuse.
While Negri insists he has gone
beyond Leninism, written a "black mark through the Third
International," he retains its syntax and grammar. His "politics of
subversion" are still a politics that ends up worshiping power, not
seeking to dissolve it:
After
centuries of capitalist exploitation, it [the working class] is not prepared to
sell itself for a bowl of lentils, or for hare-brained notions that it should
free itself within the domination of capital. The enjoyment that the class
seeks is the real enjoyment of power, not the gratification of an illusion.[26]
In this formulation of the "real enjoyment of
power" we see the real Negri. In the same breath, he dismisses joyful
participation in revolutionary struggle as opportunism. No doubt his
fascination with power is one reason for his more recent uncritical
incorporation of Machiavelli into ÒcommunistÓ theory.
In the 20th century, the
New Left's impetus to self-management and group autonomy represented the
consolidation of the historical experience of autonomous social movements.
Beginning with the spontaneous creation of soviets in 1905, the council
communists and revolutions of 1917, and the Spanish revolution, the industrial
working class expressing its autonomy in general strikes and insurrections.
Later the nascent new working class contested control of entire cities
(including factories) in 1968 and 1989, and through uprisings as in Gwangju in
1980, peoplesÕ movements autonomously reformulated the meaning of freedom. The
capacity of millions of ordinary people to govern themselves with far more
intelligence and justice than entrenched elites is evident in all these cases.
For example, during the massive strike of May 1970 in the US, the largest single
strike in American history to date,[27]
an assault was mounted both from within and outside the system that
spontaneously generated what a high ranking US government official called
capable of constituting a Òshadow government.Ó[28]
Modeled on SDS, Federal Employees for a Democratic Society, appeared in
Washington D.C., not created by any revolutionary control center, but by the
movementÕs conscious spontaneityÓ[29]
Rather than deal with any
substantive histories of these movements, Negri locates his analysis in the
categories he imposes. Looking back at 1968, his history becomes a history of
workers movements. Indeed, he postulates the initial emergence of the
"socialized worker" in 1968.[30]
Much like the various M-L groups
that sought to appropriate popular New Left organizations like SDS into their
parties, Negri seeks to appropriate the history of these popular upsurges into
his theoretical schema. While some postmodernists insist on the unique
particularity of social action and insist there is no universal, Negri's false
universality destroys the particular history of the 1960s. Although workers
participated in these struggles, they followed the lead of students and the
revolt's epicenter was in the universities, not the factories. While these
struggles were not proletarian in appearance, their universality resided in the
concrete demands that spontaneously emerged, in the New Left's notion of
self-management and international solidarity—the twin aspirations of
popular movements of millions of people throughout the world in 1968.
Immediately after the events of May
1968 in France, Marcuse was one of the few theorists who recognized the newness
of the subject and was able to connect it with a dialectical theory of history:
Éthe
location (or rather contraction) of the opposition in certain middle-class
strata and in the ghetto populationÉis caused by the internal development of
the societyÉthe displacement of the negating forces from their traditional base
among the underlying population, rather than being a sign of the weakness of
the opposition against the integrating power of advanced capitalism, may well
be the slow formation of a new base, bringing to the fore the new historical
Subject of change, responding to new objective conditions, with qualitatively
different needs and aspirations.[31]
Strategic Concerns
In 1985 and again in 1990, Negri defined the five tasks awaiting movements of the future:
--the concrete redefinition of the work force
--taking control over and liberating the time of the work day
--a permanent struggle against the repressive functions of the State
--constructing peace
--organizing machines of struggle capable of assuming these tasks.[32]
Where are concerns such as:
--developing interracial bonds
capable of withstanding government manipulation
--creating postpatriarchal
human beings with the capacity to live, love (and work) non-hierarchically
--protecting the environment
--building counterinstitutions and
liberating public space
--establishing communes to
transform everyday life.
One of the reasons these are
insignificant to Negri is because he postulates the revolutionary as a cyborg.
He has no notion of changing human beings or of cultural revolution; instead he
appropriates "the social" into a schematic productionist model. For
Negri, "There exists no consciousness apart from militancy and
organization."[33]
The system's assault on autonomous
time and space of the life-world intensifies. Negri's fetishization of
production renders him incapable of comprehending the significance of youth as
non-production strata so vitally important to our future. As young people are
drawn into violence and death drugs, Negri calmly remarks:
Let us
be clear: violence is the normal state of relations between men; it is also the
key to progress in the forces of production.[34]
How could Negri publish such a statement? In the first
place, his use of the term "men" excludes women. Moreover he defames
nature. Abundant anthropological evidence of cooperation and group life exists.
Here is the crucial point: Bourgeois thought takes the categories of the
present and projects them as valid for all time, a feat accomplished above by
Negri, since it is primarily capitalist production and struggles for scarcity
that pit humans against each other today.
The subversion of
politics—the complete uprooting of authoritarianism in our everyday
lives—begins by changing our assumptions and includes a restructuring of
ideological categories that prefigure our praxis. Reducing humansÕ capacity for
life to categories of production effectively empties freedom of its sensuous
content. If freedom is to mean anything, it begins with the subordination of
production to human needs, not the subsumption of life in production.
[1] An earlier draft of this section originally appeared
in Socialism and Democracy 20:1,
March 2006.
[2] See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000) pp.
128, 131, 140, and 209. Discussion of how their concept of empire fails to
understand Latin American reality can be found in Empire and Dissent, a special issue of NACLA Report on the Americas (Vol. 39, No. 2) September/October 2005.
[3] Empire, p. 189.
[4] Rosa Luxemburg noted that by adding the "third
person" (those at the periphery of the world system) as well as the
continual incorporation of domains of life outside the system of commodity
production, MarxÕs model could be completed.
[5] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Labor of
Dionysus: A Critique of the State-Form
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), hereafter L of D, p. 20.
[6] L of D, p. 286. Further discussion of their rejection
of dialectical thinking in this book is readily available. See especially pp.
217, 267-9, and 284-6.
[7] L of D, pp. 10-11.
[8] Empire,
p. 189, and Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004) p. 12. (Emphasis
in the original.)
[9] See my Subversion of Politics: European Autonomous
Movements and the Decolonization of Everyday Life (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1997) new edition
forthcoming, AK Press, 2006, Chapter 2.
[10] Felix Guattari and Toni Negri, Communists Like Us (New York: Semiotext, 1990) hereafter referred to as
CLU,
pp. 22 and 119.
[11] Mark Poster makes this point in his introduction to
Jean Baudrillard's The Mirror of Production (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975) p. 3.
[12] CLU, pp. 111 and 120.
[13] L of D, p. 13. In fairness, they are not alone in
their advocating of the cheerful cyborg. See Donna J. Haraway, Simians,
Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991).
[14] L of D, p. 11.
[15] Michael Ryan's introduction to Negri's Marx Beyond Marx completely ignores feminism's influence on Italian Autonomia. He does not even understand the meaning of autonomy to include the autonomous women's movement.
[16] ."DEMAU (Demystifying Authority)
Manifesto," in Italian Feminist Thought: A Reader edited by Paola Bono and Sandra Kemp (London: Basil
Blackwell, 1991) pp. 34-5.
[17] Hegel, Philosophy of Right (London: Oxford University Press, 1952) p. 266. Max
Horkheimer, Critical Theory (New
York: Herder and Herder, 1972) pp. 105-106.
[18] Andre Gorz, Farewell to the Working Class (Boston: South End Press, 1982), p.6.
[19] Harvard University press calls Empire Òa new Communist Manifesto.Ó Harry Cleaver places Negri above Marx, asserting
that: "If Marx did not mean what Negri says he did, so much the worse for
Marx." Following NegriÕs disdain for Marcuse, Cleaver uses a military
analogy to belittle the thinking of the Frankfurt School: ÒIf Patton had read that book of his declared opponent
[Rommel] the way Critical Theorists read bourgeois authors, he would still have
been sitting in his quarters writing 'critiques' of this point or that when
Rommel rolled over him with his army.Ó (See Harry Cleaver, Reading Capital
Politically (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1979) p. 42.) Cleaver's reliance on the military analogy is a
projection of his masculine identity onto the "working class" and
perverts the revolutionary project, making it into a simple question of brute
force. Precisely such reduction of the working class to brutes is part of the
reason why autonomous workers' movements appeared: Normal working-class people
refused to tolerate their being treated as foot soldiers by self-appointed
Leftist generals.
[20] Negri, Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse (New York: Autonomedia, 1991) p. 154.
[21] L of D, p. 291.
[22] CLU, pp. 122-3.
[23] Herbert Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972) p. 9.
[24] CLU, pp. 153-4. He is referring to a text he
published together with Felix Guattari in 1985. Long before that time, the
Autonomen had consolidated themselves throughout central Europe (Holland,
Switzerland and Germany). The autonomous women's movement had also created
counterinstitutions and campaigns against criminalization of abortion. Negri's
silence about these movements is predicated upon his failure to yet internalize
an understanding of the importance of non-factory based movements.
[25] CLU, p. 172.
[26] Negri, Revolution Retrieved (London: Red Notes, 1988) p. 138.
[27] While not a workersÕ strike in which wages were at
stake, students risked loss of grades, careers, graduation and personal safety.
In 16 states, the National Guard was called out to put down protesting
students, and besides the four killed at Kent State and two at Jackson State,
dozens more were wounded by gunfire from the forces of order.
[28] Joseph A. Califano, Jr., The Student Revolution: A
Global Confrontation (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1970) p. 88.
[29] To name just one area needing attention in our
collective reevaluation of revolutionary thinking after the fall of the Soviet
Union: the role of spontaneity should be reopened with a fresh sense of its
importance. With their Leninist critique of spontaneity, Soviet Communists
continually sought to impose correct ideas on popular movements. Whether in
Russia, China or anywhere, their theories were assumed to be universally
applicable. Seeking to impose on the "masses" their own particular
version of the truth, they mobilized some of the fiercest programs of death of the
twentieth century.
[30] See Negri, The Politics of Subversion (Cambridge,UK: Polity Press, 1989), p. 141 and CLU,
p. 68.
[31] Herbert Marcuse, Essay on Liberation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969) p. 52.
[32] CLU, pp. 146-7.
[33] The Politics of Subversion, p. 148
[34] Negri, Revolution Retrieved, p. 131.