

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
MASSACHUSETTS - BOSTON DIVISION

GEORGE KATSIAFICAS,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
v.)
)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY)
)
Defendant.)
_____)

Case No. 1:13-CV-11058-WGY

DECLARATION OF MARTHA M. LUTZ
CHIEF OF THE LITIGATION SUPPORT UNIT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

I. INTRODUCTION

I, MARTHA M. LUTZ, hereby declare and state:

1. I am the Chief of the Litigation Support Unit of the Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA" or "Agency"). I have held this position since October 2012. Prior to assuming this position, I served as the Information Review Officer ("IRO") for the Director's Area of the CIA for over thirteen years. In that capacity, I was responsible for making classification and release determinations for information originating within the Director's Area, which includes, among others offices, the Office of the Director of the CIA, the Office of Congressional Affairs, and the Office of General Counsel. I have held other administrative and professional positions within the CIA since 1989.

2. As the Chief of the Litigation Support Unit, I am currently responsible for the classification review of CIA documents and information that may be the subject of court proceedings or public requests for information under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552. I am a senior CIA official and hold original classification authority at the TOP SECRET level under written delegation of authority pursuant to section 1.3(c) of Executive Order No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Jan. 5, 2010), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. 435 note at 268 (West Supp. 2012) ("E.O. 13526"). This means that I am authorized to assess the current, proper classification of CIA information, up to and including TOP SECRET information, based on the classification criteria of E.O. 13526 and applicable regulations.

3. Pursuant to authority delegated by the Associate Deputy Director of the CIA, I also have been appointed Records Validation Officer ("RVO"). As RVO, I am authorized to sign on behalf of the CIA regarding searches for records and the contents of any located or referred records, including those containing information under the cognizance of any or all CIA directorates or areas.

4. Through the exercise of my official duties, I have become familiar with this civil action and the underlying FOIA requests. I make the following statements based upon my

personal knowledge and information made available to me in my official capacity. This is the second declaration signed by me and filed in this matter. I previously signed a declaration submitted in support of the Motion to Dismiss filed by the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Massachusetts ("USAO") with respect to one of the Plaintiff's FOIA requests, and I am submitting this declaration in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the USAO with respect to the Plaintiff's remaining FOIA request.

5. The purpose of this Declaration is to explain and justify, to the greatest extent possible on the public record, the CIA's actions in responding to Plaintiff's FOIA requests. Part II of this Declaration will chronicle Plaintiff's FOIA requests and the CIA's response to those requests; and Part III will describe the CIA's reasonable searches conducted in response to the Plaintiff's FOIA request at issue in DOJ's Motion for Summary Judgment. It is my understanding that the Plaintiff has not challenged the application of FOIA exemptions to his request.

II. PLAINTIFF'S FOIA REQUESTS

6. I have previously described for this Court the history of the Plaintiff's FOIA requests, but provide the same history below for the Court's convenience. By letter dated 4 March 2010, the Plaintiff, George Katsiaficas, submitted two FOIA

requests to the CIA. (See 4 March 2010 Request letter, attached hereto as Exhibit A.) The first request (the "Coup Request") sought "records related, describing, and/or concerning the coup d'etat of May 16, 1961 in South Korea through which General Park Chung-hee seized power." The Plaintiff further stated that he was "especially interested in all agency communications in this matter with US Army officer James Hausman, long-time friend and confidant of Park Chung-hee." The Coup Request included a request for "CIA, DIA¹ and all US government documents related to Park Chung-hee's meetings with US government personnel, and any materials referring to the May 16, 1961 coup d'etat." The second request (the "Assassination Documents Request") sought "records related, describing, and /or concerning the assassination of the Southern Korean President Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979 in Seoul, South Korea." The Assassination Documents Request included a request for "CIA, DIA and all US government documents related to the assassination, to his assassin (Korean Central Agency chairman Kim Kae-kyu), to US persons' meetings with both individuals named above, and to any other materials referring to President Park's assassination." This declaration and the motion it accompanies relate primarily

¹ "DIA" is an acronym commonly used to refer to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

to the Coup Request, but I describe below the process by which the CIA received and responded to both requests:

7. By letter dated 8 April 2010, the CIA responded to the Plaintiff and provided him with the request reference number F-2010-00766, which had been assigned to the Coup Request. (See 8 April 2010 Coup Request Acceptance letter, attached hereto as Exhibit B.) The CIA further informed the Plaintiff that, due to the large number of FOIA requests received by the CIA, it was unlikely that he would receive a response within 20 days. The CIA explained that the Plaintiff had the right to consider its honest appraisal of the processing time to be a denial of his request, and could appeal to the CIA's Agency Release Panel if he so chose.

8. On the same date, 8 April 2010, the CIA responded by separate letter to the Plaintiff and provided him with the request reference number F-2010-00767, which had been assigned to the Assassination Documents Request. (See 8 April 2010 Assassination Documents Request Acceptance letter, attached hereto as Exhibit C.) As with the Coup Request, the CIA informed the Plaintiff that, due to the large number of FOIA requests received by the CIA, it was unlikely that he would receive a response within 20 days and that the Plaintiff had the right to consider its honest appraisal of the processing time to

be a denial of his request. The CIA stated that the Plaintiff could appeal to the CIA's Agency Release Panel if he so chose.

9. After receiving both requests, the CIA contacted the Plaintiff by telephone to discuss his requests. The Plaintiff consented to limit his request only to CIA-originated documents. (See 22 April 2010 FPPL Request memorializing call from Plaintiff, attached hereto as Exhibit D.) Several days later, on 26 April 2010, the CIA tasked out searches reasonably calculated to identify all CIA records responsive to the Plaintiff's requests, described in more detail below. It is my understanding that the USAO's Motion for Summary Judgment relates solely to the Coup Request and that DOJ has previously filed a Motion to Dismiss with respect to the Assassination Documents Request. Therefore, I describe below only the searches conducted in response to the Coup Request.

10. On 13 October 2010, the Plaintiff wrote to the CIA via his attorney and requested a response or an estimated time of response with respect to "his FOIA request to the CIA dated April 4, 2010 with receipt acknowledged April 8, 2010." (See 13 October 2010 Katsiaficas letter, attached hereto as Exhibit E.) The Plaintiff cited only the request reference number that was assigned to the Assassination Documents Request. The CIA treated this letter as relating only to the Assassination Documents Request, explicitly included only the reference number

of the Assassination Documents Request in the subject line, and responded by letter on 9 November 2010 citing the "request for records regarding 'the assassination of the South Korean President Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979 in Seoul, South Korea.'" (See 9 November 2010 CIA letter, attached hereto as Exhibit F.) The CIA explained that agency policy is to handle FOIA requests on a "first-in, first-out basis" and that such an approach is "most equitable for all requesters." As such, the CIA was unable to provide a definite date for completion.

11. On 11 February 2011, the Plaintiff, via his attorney, sent another letter to the CIA. This letter requested a status update and referred to both request reference numbers and the Plaintiff's "two FOIA request[s]." (See 11 February 2011 Katsiaficas letter, attached hereto as Exhibit G.) The CIA treated this letter as referring to both the Coup Request and the Assassination Documents Request and responded by letter dated 2 March 2011, citing both request reference numbers and describing both the Coup Request and the Assassination Documents Request. (See 2 March 2011 CIA letter, attached hereto as Exhibit H.) The CIA explained that response time is "predicated on the number and complexity of the requests [the CIA] receive[s]."

12. On 29 March 2011, the CIA provided the Plaintiff with a final response to the Coup Request, consisting of 11 documents

with a total of 29 pages. (See 29 March 2011 Coup Request Final Response letter, attached hereto as Exhibit I.) Portions of those documents were redacted, as they contained information that is properly subject to FOIA exemptions b(1) and b(3). The CIA's final response letter cited only to the request reference number for the Coup Request, F-2010-00766, and explicitly stated that it was a final response to the Plaintiff's request for records regarding "the coup d'etat of May 16, 1961 in South Korea through which General Park Chung-hee seized power." The final response letter further informed the Plaintiff that he had the right to appeal to the Agency Release Panel within 45 days of the date of the letter, 29 March 2011. The final response letter dated 29 May 2011 related only to the Coup Request. The CIA did not send the Plaintiff a final response letter with respect to the Assassination Documents Request at that time because the request was still being processed.

13. On 9 May 2011, the Plaintiff sent a letter to the CIA purportedly relating to the "FOIA requests of George Katsiaficas dated March 4, 2010" and appealing the CIA's final response on the basis that it was "unresponsive and insufficient in three ways":

- There was "no source material at all, no actual Agency reports or documents concerning the events subject to the FOIA request";

- There was "no response at all to the request for all agency communications between US Army officer James Hausman and General Park"; and
- There was "no response at all to the request concerning the 1979 assassination of General Park."

(See 9 May 2011 Coup Request Appeal letter, attached hereto as Exhibit J.)

14. The Plaintiff appears to have misinterpreted the CIA's final response letter to the Coup Request and attempted, in his letter to the Agency Release Panel, to appeal the CIA's response to both the Coup Request and the Assassination Documents Request. Noting this mistake, the CIA responded to the Plaintiff's letter on 18 August 2011 and explained that the Assassination Documents Request "was assigned the reference number F-2010-00767 and is still being processed. Therefore this portion of the request is not being considered in the appeal of F-2010-00766 [the Coup Request]." (See 18 August 2011 Coup Request Appeal Acceptance letter, attached hereto as Exhibit K.) The CIA accepted the appeal of the Coup Request and explained that it would be handled on a "first-received, first-out basis."

15. On 20 July 2012, the CIA provided the Plaintiff with a final response to the Assassination Documents Request, consisting of 4 documents with a total of 10 pages. (See 20

July Assassination Documents Request Final Response letter, attached hereto as Exhibit L.) Portions of those documents were redacted, as they contained information that is properly subject to FOIA exemptions b(1) and b(3), as described below. The final response letter also noted that, while the Plaintiff's request had initially sought DIA and U.S. Government documents, the Plaintiff had agreed pursuant to an April 2012 telephone conversation to limit his request to CIA records. The final response letter further informed the Plaintiff that he had the right to appeal to the Agency Release Panel within 45 days of the date of the letter, 20 July 2012. The CIA received no letter appealing the final agency response to the Assassination Documents Request.

16. On 30 April 2013, the Plaintiff filed the instant complaint.

17. On 19 February 2014, the CIA sent the Plaintiff a letter resolving his appeal of the final agency response to the Coup Request. (See 19 February 2014 Agency Release Panel letter, attached hereto as Exhibit M.) The CIA's Agency Release Panel, charged with handling appeals of final responses under FOIA, reviewed the final agency response to the Coup Request. It determined that the portions previously withheld from the 11 documents released to the Plaintiff in response to the Coup Request were properly withheld under FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and

(b)(3), and the material denied in its entirety was properly denied on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). The Agency Release Panel further informed the Plaintiff that it had located two additional documents that might be of interest to him, both of which had been released to the public previously, and provided those documents as enclosures to the 19 February 2014 letter.

III. The CIA'S SEARCH FOR RESPONSIVE RECORDS

A. CIA's Records Systems

18. All FOIA requests submitted to the CIA come to the Information and Privacy Coordinator, Information Management Services ("IMS"). Once a FOIA request is received, and under the direction and supervision of the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, experienced IMS professionals analyze the request and determine which CIA components reasonably might be expected to possess responsive records. IMS then transmits a copy of the request to each relevant component.

19. All CIA components are contained within one of five directorates or office clusters: the National Clandestine Service ("NCS"), the Directorate of Intelligence ("DI"), the Directorate of Science and Technology ("DS&T"), the Directorate of Support ("DS"), and the Director of CIA Area ("DIR Area").

20. The NCS is the organization within the CIA responsible for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence from

human sources. The NCS's records system contains information on persons who are of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence interest to CIA and other U.S. Government agencies.

Appropriately trained personnel conduct FOIA searches of the NCS's records system as part of their normal responsibilities.

21. The DI is the CIA component that analyzes, interprets, and forecasts foreign intelligence issues and world events of importance to the United States. The DI is also responsible for the production of finished intelligence reports for dissemination to policymakers in the U.S. Government.

Appropriately trained personnel regularly conduct FOIA searches of the DI records system as part of their normal responsibilities.

22. The DS&T is the CIA component responsible for creating and applying technology to fulfill intelligence requirements. Appropriately trained personnel regularly conduct FOIA searches of the DS&T's records system as part of their normal responsibilities.

23. The DS provides the CIA with mission-critical services, including the protection of CIA personnel, security matters generally, facilities, communications, logistics, training, financial management, medical services, and human resources. It maintains records on all current and former CIA employees, whether employed in a contract or staff capacity, as well as

other individuals for whom security processing or evaluation has been required. Appropriately trained personnel regularly conduct FOIA searches of the DS's records system as part of their normal responsibilities.

24. The DIR Area is a cluster of offices directly responsible to the Director of CIA, such as the Office of General Counsel, the Office of Inspector General, and the Office of Congressional Affairs, and is distinct from the Agency's main directorates. Appropriately trained DIR Area personnel regularly conduct FOIA searches of the DIR Area systems of records as part of their normal responsibilities.

25. Because the CIA's records systems are decentralized and compartmented, each directorate IRO must determine which components within the directorate might reasonably be expected to possess records responsive to a particular request and then work with personnel within each of those components to devise a search strategy tailored to the component's configuration of its records systems and unique characteristics of that configuration. This process includes identifying which of the records systems subject to FOIA provisions to search as well as which search tools, methods, and terms to employ. In many of the components, the information management professionals conducting FOIA searches are the same professionals searching records in support of the component's daily mission.

26. The CIA employees who performed the necessary searches for the FOIA request below: (a) have access to the pertinent records; (b) are qualified to search those records; and (c) regularly search those records in the course of their professional duties.

B. CIA's Search for Records Responsive to the Plaintiff's Coup Request

27. The CIA processed the Coup Request following the same procedures as set forth above. That is, the request was received by IMS, reviewed by IMS professionals expert in the tasking of records searches, and tasked to the directorates reasonably likely to have records that are subject to the FOIA and Privacy Act and are responsive to the request.

28. During this time period, the CIA conducted searches reasonably calculated to uncover all CIA records responsive to the Plaintiff's requests. In particular, the CIA took the following steps in response to the Coup Request:

a. The CIA tasked the Directorate of Intelligence ("DI") to search relevant Agency-wide and DI records systems. These DI searches are structured in such a way as to locate both DI analytical finished intelligence product, and intelligence reports drafted by the National Clandestine Service ("NCS") that are disseminated to the U.S. Intelligence Community and not exempt from search

under FOIA's Operational Files Exemption. Therefore, this search was designed to locate responsive documents for both the DI and NCS, the CIA components believed to possess documents responsive to this request.

b. The DI applied broad search terms designed to locate all responsive documents created between 1 January 1961 and 1 January 1962. These search terms were created by individuals with expertise in each records-keeping system and in light of the particular search mechanisms available in each database.

c. Within the CIA's database of previously-released documents, the CIA searched for all documents released in part or in full containing "chunghee" or "chung hee" within 15 words of "coup." Similarly, within the DI's primary research and analysis database, the CIA searched for all documents containing: (1) "chunghee" or "chung hee," (2) "coup," and (3) "korea." Within the CIA's archived records database, the CIA searched for all documents containing: (1) "park," (2) "korea," and (3) "coup." Within the CIA's Intelligence Publications Index and its database containing disseminated intelligence products that pre-date 1967, the CIA searched for all documents containing the term "park."

29. The CIA located 20 documents using these search terms: 5 of those documents were determined to be non-responsive, and

the CIA reviewed the remaining 15 to determine what, if any, information should be properly withheld under exemptions to FOIA. The CIA determined that 11 documents could be released in part or in full, and that 4 documents must be withheld entirely pursuant to FOIA exemptions b(1) and b(3).

30. On consideration of the Plaintiff's appeal, the CIA affirmed that, of the 15 previously-located records, 4 must be withheld in full pursuant to FOIA exemptions b(1) and b(3), and 11 could be released with redactions pursuant to FOIA exemptions b(1) and b(3). The DI did not believe that any additional searches needed to be run on DI databases, but in order to ensure that all responsive records had been located, the DI requested that the NCS be directly tasked on appeal. The NCS searched its systems of records for Park Chung-hee. The NCS database searched functionally searches for both "Park Chung-hee" and "Chung-hee Park," as well as commonly-appearing variants on the spelling.² The NCS did not limit this search by time frame. The NCS located 4 records, 2 of which were deemed to be non-responsive. The remaining 2 records had been previously released, and the CIA provided the Plaintiff with copies of those records as previously released.

² For example, the NCS database search included the following variants on "Chung": "Tschung," "Ckeng," "Ceng," "Chunag," "Chkung," "Tizchang," "Kung," "Schungt," and "Sichong."


31. It is my understanding that the Plaintiff has not contested the application of FOIA exemptions b(1) and b(3) to the records located in the CIA's search. As a result, I will not further address the CIA's withholdings concerning these documents. For the Court's reference, the 11 documents released to Plaintiff in response to the Coup Request are attached hereto as Exhibit N, and the 2 documents released to Plaintiff pursuant to his appeal are attached hereto as Exhibit O.

VII. CONCLUSION

32. In this case, the CIA conducted a thorough search for responsive, non-exempt records responsive to the Coup Request, and produced 13 such records with appropriate redactions to the Plaintiff.

I hereby declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this 28th day of February 2014.



Martha M. Lutz,
Chief of the Litigation Support Unit,
Central Intelligence Agency

F-2010-00766e

March 4, 2010

Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Freedom of Information Act REQUEST

Dear FOIA Officer:

Pursuant to the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, I request access to and copies of records related, describing, and/or concerning the coup d'etat of May 16, 1961 in South Korea through which General Park Chung-hee seized power. I am especially interested in all agency communications in this matter with US Army officer James Hausman, long-time friend and confidant of Park Chung-hee. Hausman may have been retired from the US Army by 1961 and working in another, perhaps even unofficial, capacity. I also include in this request all CIA, DIA and all US government documents related to Park Chung-hee's meetings with US government personnel, and any materials referring to the May 16, 1961 coup d'etat.

MAR 10 2010

I would like to receive the information in electronic format. (CD-ROM.)

My articles have previously appeared in the *Boston Globe*, *Chronicle of Higher Education*, and other publications. I intend to publish my findings as a journalist. I therefore request waiver of all fees associated with duplicating these materials. If necessary, I would agree to pay reasonable duplication fees for the processing of this request.

If my request is denied in whole or part, I ask that you justify all deletions by reference to specific exemptions of the act. I will also expect you to release all segregable portions of otherwise exempt material. I, of course, reserve the right to appeal your decision to withhold any information or to deny a waiver of fees.


As I am making this request as an author and this information is of timely value, I would appreciate your communicating with me by e-mail or by

telephone, rather than by mail, if you have questions regarding this request.

I look forward to your reply within 20 business days, as the statute requires.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'G. Katsiaficas', with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

George Katsiaficas, PhD
Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Wentworth Institute of Technology
550 Huntington Avenue
Boston MA 02115
katsiaficasg@wit.edu
617-989-4384



Washington, D.C. 20505

8 April 2010

George Katsiaficas, Ph.D.
Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Wentworth Institute of Technology
550 Huntington Avenue
Boston, MA 02115

Reference: F-2010-00766

Dear Dr. Katsiaficas:

On 10 March 2010, the office of the Information and Privacy Coordinator received your 4 March 2010 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records regarding **“the coup d’etat of May 16, 1961 in South Korea through which General Park Chung-hee seized power.”** We have assigned your request the reference number above. Please use this number when corresponding so that we can identify it easily.

The CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431, as amended, exempts CIA operational files from the search, review, publication, and disclosure requirements of the FOIA. To the extent your request seeks information that is subject to the FOIA, we accept your request and will process it in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act. We will search for records existing through the date of this acceptance letter. As a matter of administrative discretion, and in accordance with our regulations, the Agency has waived the fees for this request.

The large number of FOIA requests CIA receives has created unavoidable delays making it unlikely that we can respond within the 20 working days the FOIA requires. You have the right to consider our honest appraisal as a denial of your request and you may appeal to the Agency Release Panel. A more practical approach would permit us to continue processing your request and respond to you as soon as we can. You will retain your appeal rights and, once you receive the results of our search, can appeal at that time if you wish. We will proceed on that basis unless you object.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Delores M. Nelson".

Delores M. Nelson
Information and Privacy Coordinator



Washington, D.C. 20505

8 April 2010

George Katsiaficas, Ph.D.
Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Wentworth Institute of Technology
550 Huntington Avenue
Boston, MA 02115

Reference: F-2010-00767

Dear Dr. Katsiaficas:

On 10 March 2010, the office of the Information and Privacy Coordinator received your 4 March 2010 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records regarding **“the assassination of the South Korean President Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979 in Seoul, South Korea.”** We have assigned your request the reference number above. Please use this number when corresponding so that we can identify it easily.

The CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431, as amended, exempts CIA operational files from the search, review, publication, and disclosure requirements of the FOIA. To the extent your request seeks information that is subject to the FOIA, we accept your request and will process it in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act. We will search for records existing through the date of this acceptance letter. As a matter of administrative discretion, and in accordance with our regulations, the Agency has waived the fees for this request.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Delores M. Nelson".

Delores M. Nelson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

UNCLASSIFIED

FPPL Request

(-> denotes required items, * denotes conditionally required items)
04/22/2010

Date created:

-> Action ID: FPPL-2010-0157	-> Status: Closed	-> Composer: Beverly [REDACTED]
-> Priority: Medium	-> Request date: 04/22/2010	-> Request time: 12:15 PM
-> Requester: Dr. George Kitsifics	-> Phone: [REDACTED]	Organization:
-> POC (primary): Phyllis [REDACTED]		Phone:
POC (secondary):		Phone:
Cross reference:		

-> Request description: The answer to your question, yes, limited to CIA. F-2010-000766/767

Response information:

Interim response

Interim response

Attempt No. 1

Attempt No. 1

Action:	
Respondent name:	Date:

Attempt No. 2

Attempt No. 2

Action:	
Respondent name:	Date:

Attempt No. 3

Attempt No. 3

Action:	
Respondent name:	Date:

Final response

Final response

* Response: Requester answered case manager questions

* Respondent name: Phyllis [REDACTED] * Date: 04/23/2010

* Required if status is Closed

UNCLASSIFIED

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Common Sense Legal Counseling
Attorney Neil J Berman

109 College Avenue
Somerville, MA 02144
(617) 628-1563 phone
(617) 776-0074 fax
e-mail: njberman2@juno.com

October 13, 2010

CIA
FOIA Public Liaison
Washington DC 20505

Re: FOIA Request of Dr. George Katsiaficas
Reference No. F-2010-00767

Dear FOIA Public Liaison:

I represent Dr. George Katsiaficas concerning his FOIA request to the CIA dated April 4, 2010 with receipt acknowledged April 8, 2010.

It has been 6 months since Dr. Katsiaficas' request was received by your organization. While he understood that the number of FOIA requests to the CIA made it impossible for you to comply with the 20 day requirement, he and I feel that 6 months is enough time for the CIA to be able to fulfill the request, or at least be able to give an estimated time of response. I am writing to ask for information concerning what progress has been made as well as an estimated response time.

Please direct correspondence concerning this matter to my attention at the above addresses, either by US mail or email. I feel a response within 10 days of this request is reasonable and look forward to your response.

Very truly yours,



Neil J Berman

OCT 19 2010

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

9 November 2010

Neil J. Berman, Esq.
109 College Avenue
Somerville, MA 02144

Reference: F-2010-00767

Dear Mr. Berman:

This acknowledges receipt of your 13 October 2010 letter, sent on behalf of your client, Dr. George Katsiaficas, requesting an estimated response time concerning his 4 March 2010 Freedom of Information Act request for records regarding "the assassination of the South Korean President Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979 in Seoul, South Korea."

We can appreciate your concern with not having received a final response to your request. It is the overwhelming number of requests and their complexity that causes delays in our responses. Our policy is to handle each on a first-in, first-out basis, which we believe is the most equitable for all requesters. Again, we regret that we are unable to give you a definite date for completion and ask for your continued cooperation.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "Scott Koch", written in a cursive style.

Scott Koch
Acting Information and Privacy Coordinator

F-2010-00766e

March 4, 2010

Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Freedom of Information Act REQUEST

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Pursuant to the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552, I request access to and copies of records related, describing, and/or concerning the coup d'etat of May 16, 1961 in South Korea through which General Park Chung-hee seized power. I am especially interested in all agency communications in this matter with US Army officer James Hausman, long-time friend and confidant of Park Chung-hee. Hausman may have been retired from the US Army by 1961 and working in another, perhaps even unofficial, capacity. I also include in this request all CIA, DIA and all US government documents related to Park Chung-hee's meetings with US government personnel, and any materials referring to the May 16, 1961 coup d'etat.

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
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Dear Dr. Katsiaficas:

On 10 March 2010, the office of the Information and Privacy Coordinator received your 4 March 2010 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records regarding **“the coup d’etat of May 16, 1961 in South Korea through which General Park Chung-hee seized power.”** We have assigned your request the reference number above. Please use this number when corresponding so that we can identify it easily.

The CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431, as amended, exempts CIA operational files from the search, review, publication, and disclosure requirements of the FOIA. To the extent your request seeks information that is subject to the FOIA, we accept your request and will process it in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act. We will search for records existing through the date of this acceptance letter. As a matter of administrative discretion, and in accordance with our regulations, the Agency has waived the fees for this request.

The large number of FOIA requests CIA receives has created unavoidable delays making it unlikely that we can respond within the 20 working days the FOIA requires. You have the right to consider our honest appraisal as a denial of your request and you may appeal to the Agency Release Panel. A more practical approach would permit us to continue processing your request and respond to you as soon as we can. You will retain your appeal rights and, once you receive the results of our search, can appeal at that time if you wish. We will proceed on that basis unless you object.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Delores M. Nelson".

Delores M. Nelson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

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Common Sense Legal Counseling

Attorney Neil J Berman

109 College Avenue
Somerville, MA 02144
(617) 628-1563 phone
(617) 776-0074 fax
e-mail: njberman2@juno.com

February 11, 2011

CIA
FOIA Public Liaison
Washington DC 20505

Re: FOIA Request of Dr. George Katsiaficas
Reference Numbers: F-2010-00766 & F-2010-00767

Dear FOIA Public Liaison:

I represent Dr. George Katsiaficas concerning his two FOIA request to the CIA dated March 4, 2010 with receipt acknowledged April 8, 2010. While my client & I understand that due to the volume of requests make the 20 day response requirement of the FOIA difficult for the CIA to conform too, it has been ten months now and we believe it has been long enough for a response to be delivered.

After Dr. Katsiaficas' request were received Delores M. Nelson responded stating the requests would be processed and the CIA respond as soon as possible. I wrote on October 13, 2010 asking for a response, and received a letter from Scott Koch, Acting Information and Privacy Coordinator. Mr. Koch again, pointing to the volume of requests, wrote that the request would be processed on a first-in, first-out basis.

It has been ten months since Dr. Katsiaficas' request were received by your organization, and we both believe this is enough time to respond, or at least be able to give an estimated time of response. I am writing to again ask for information concerning what progress has been made as well as an estimated response time. I feel a response within 20 days of this request, either with the information requested or a date certain when the information will be received, is reasonable. If this is not done I will be advising Dr. Katsiaficas' to pursue all legal avenues available to him.

Please direct correspondence concerning this matter to my attention at the above addresses, either by US mail or email. I look forward to your response.

Very truly yours,


Neil J Berman

FEB 17 2011

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Neil J Bernan
Common Sense Legal Counseling
109 College Avenue
Somerville MA 02144

CIA
FOIA Public Liaison
Washington DC 20505

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

2 March 2011

Neil J. Berman, Esq.
109 College Avenue
Somerville, MA 02144

Reference: F-2010-00766 / F-2010-00767

Dear Mr. Berman:

This acknowledges receipt of your 11 February 2011 letter, sent on behalf of your client, Dr. George Katsiaficas, requesting an estimated response time concerning his 4 March 2010 Freedom of Information Act requests for records regarding "the assassination of the South Korean President Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979 in Seoul, South Korea" and "the coup d'etat of May 16, 1961 in South Korea through which General Park Chung-hee seized power."

Our response time is unfortunately predicated on the number and complexity of the requests we receive. Even when a request reaches the top of the queue, we must go through the time-consuming task of reviewing each and every document, assuming documents are in fact found. This process is necessary in order to fulfill the statutory obligation this agency has to protect intelligence sources and methods and other sensitive information.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Susan Viscuso", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Susan Viscuso
Information and Privacy Coordinator



Washington, D.C. 20505

29 March 2011

George Katsiaficas, Ph.D.
Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Wentworth Institute of Technology
550 Huntington Avenue
Boston, MA 02115

Reference: F-2010-00766

Dear Dr. Katsiaficas:

This is a final response to your 4 March 2010 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records regarding "the coup d'etat of May 16, 1961 in South Korea through which General Park Chung-hee seized power." We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431, as amended. Our processing included a search for records as described in our 8 April 2010 acceptance letter existing through the date of that letter.

We completed a thorough search for records responsive to your request and located 11 documents, consisting of 29 pages, which we can release in segregable form with deletions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). Additional material was determined to be currently and properly classified and must be withheld in its entirety on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant statute is the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 403, as amended, e.g., Section 6, which exempts from the disclosure requirement information pertaining to the organization, functions, including those related to the protection of intelligence sources and methods, names, official titles, salaries, and numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. Copies of the documents and an explanation of exemptions are enclosed. As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 45 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Susan Viscuso", written in a cursive style.

Susan Viscuso
Information and Privacy Coordinator


Enclosures

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3 June 1961



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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South Korea: The revolutionary Supreme Council for National Reconstruction voted on 2 June to relieve Lieutenant General Chang To-yong of his substantive posts--army chief of staff, minister of national defense, and martial law commander, [redacted] Chang for the time being will retain the titular post of chairman of the Supreme Council. The move allegedly results from Chang's procrastination in supporting the coup during its early hours on 16 May, the council's belief that Chang is regarded by US officials as lacking real authority, and the conviction among the revolutionary leaders that Chang has been attempting to build up his personal power by appointing to important posts officers loyal to him. [redacted] new appointees to the positions vacated by Chang would be selected within five days. The appointment of the new army chief of staff will reportedly be made after prior consultation with the UN commander, General Magruder.

Chang had been credited with exercising a moderating influence on the regime and was believed to favor a relatively early return to civilian government. The reduction of Chang's influence will enhance that of the young colonels surrounding Major General Pak Chong-hui. This group is strongly nationalistic and eager to undertake extensive reforms but lacks positive plans or the experience to administer the government. They are likely to push for increasingly repressive measures, particularly in the event the regime fails to win wide public support. [redacted]

3 June 61

DAILY BRIEF

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USSR: An authoritative Pravda article on 2 June reiterated current Soviet views on Berlin and emphasized that the attitude toward a German peace settlement is the "touchstone of sincerity and peacefulness for any politician, any state." This apparently was in response to the announcement that the President and General de Gaulle had agreed on action to maintain Western rights in Berlin. Pravda also warned that the Soviet Union has no intention of tolerating the existing situation or of being intimidated by press accounts of Western military plans for "saving" West Berlin. [A number of bloc officials have adopted the line [redacted] that Khrushchev will be seeking a definite commitment for new negotiations, and if this fails the USSR will be "obliged" to sign a separate peace treaty. East German party chief Ulbricht in a 1 June public interview claimed he could state "unambiguously" that a peace treaty would be concluded in the "foreseeable future." [redacted]

[redacted] while Khrushchev agree to a foreign ministers' conference if the US proposed it. [redacted] Khrushchev was considering making a "very favorable" proposal to bring about agreement on a nuclear test ban? [redacted]

East Germany - USSR: The unprecedented scope of the Soviet - East German economic protocol, signed on 30 May, is [redacted]

3 June 61

DAILY BRIEF

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

SOUTH KOREA

The dominant position of Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui, the generally acknowledged leader of the South Korean military junta, is emphasized by his assumption on 9 June of the chairmanship of the standing committee of the ruling Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR). In addition to the chairman, the standing committee is composed of the heads of the seven committees covering the general areas of government administration and appears likely to become the focal point of power within the SCNR.

There is considerable evidence, however, that Pak's authority is circumscribed by factional divisions within the junta. Recent voting patterns in the 32-member Supreme Council reveal three primary groupings, with most junior officers looking to Lt. Col. Kim Chong-pil for leadership. Kim is the intelligence and security boss for the regime but is not a member of the Supreme Council. As SCNR members are presently identified, Pak is supported by 15, Kim by 10, and SCNR chairman Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong by 5. Kim has reportedly been associated with Pak since the earliest stages of the coup, but recent information has raised some question as to his loyalty to Pak.

There have been indications that the regime will adopt a harsher policy toward high officials of the former government. Pak recently publicly charged a number of former ministers with Communist activities.



A number of former senior officers--such as retired General Chong Il-kwon, ambassador-designate to the United States--reportedly will be given diplomatic assignments to keep them out of the country. One exception, however, is retired Lt. Gen. Song Yo-chan, who is studying in the United States and has been named minister of defense to succeed Acting Minister Sin Ung-kyun. Song is credited with having avoided large-scale bloodshed when he was army chief of staff at the time of Rhee's ouster last year. He is noted for his efforts to combat military corruption and, although he was personally loyal to Rhee, is believed largely to have stayed out of politics.

The public at large remains generally passive toward the regime, but American observers see growing apprehension among educated urban elements. To develop support, the junta has announced the establishment of a nationwide national front movement designed to "inspire the nation with fresh spirit, encourage new life, and strengthen anti-Communist ideology." A mass rally held in Seoul on 12 June was scheduled to attract some 100,000 persons. However, a crowd of only 30,000 attended --mostly teen-age students and housemaids, according to press reports.

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23 May 1961



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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South Korea: [South Korea's revolutionary government is still consolidating its power and neutralizing elements which might oppose it. Colonel Kim Chong-pil, who is reported to be the principal adviser of the coup strongman, Major General Pak Chong-hui, told an American official on 22 May that everyone involved in the new regime has been too busy with internal affairs to pay much attention to relationships with the United States. He asserted that the United States should not be concerned, since the revolutionary leadership was anti-Communist and pro-US. The officer said that this was true despite the resentment engendered by statements of American officials in Seoul on 16 May, which had urged support of the former Chang Myon government]

[The adviser to Pak admitted that military command principles in relation to the UN Command had been violated, but said that the intent was to make the relationship between South Korean military forces and the UN Command as close as in the past. He said the leadership feels that Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Chang To-yong has too many duties in the present arrangement--he is chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, head of the cabinet, and minister of defense--and that a new chief of staff should be appointed.]

Interservice rivalries and tension between the senior and the more numerous junior officers of the revolutionary leadership are continuing. The marines and paratroops in Seoul are reported to have refused on 21 May to obey an order by Chang To-yong to return to their camps.

[] (Backup, Page 3)

23 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

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~~SECRET~~South Korea

Apprehension appears to be growing among civilians who originally supported the coup or were apathetic to the overthrow of the Chang Myon government over the adoption of increasingly repressive tactics by the revolutionary leaders. [redacted]

[redacted] some 3,000 persons have been arrested, but it is unclear how many are hoodlums and criminals and how many are political offenders. Most newspapers have been forced to adopt a position of complete endorsement of the new regime and give a distorted picture of American reaction implying that Washington supports the revolution.

Meanwhile, new Foreign Minister Kim Hong-il appears to be attempting to allay American concern regarding the

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revolutionary government. At his first press conference Kim gave assurances that the new government's foreign policy will not differ basically from that of the Chang Myon administration. He added that negotiations would be continued for the normalization of South Korean - Japanese relations and that the new regime opposed the "march North" unification policy of the old Rhee government. Kim is a former South Korean ambassador to Nationalist China and a retired lieutenant general. He is believed to be strongly anti-Communist and to favor an authoritarian government similar to that of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan.

Peiping's People's Daily, in an editorial of 21 May, claims the US "stage-managed the coup" and labels the coup leaders "fascist." Pyongyang has broadcast reports of atrocities allegedly perpetrated by US personnel and has depicted the coup as a US-sponsored effort to "force more unbearable calamities on the South Korean people."

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18 May 1961

Copy No. 264

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE



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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

SOUTH KOREA

A force of some 3,600 army troops and marines led by Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui, deputy commander of South Korea's Second Army, seized Seoul on 16 May and deposed the government of Prime Minister Chang Myon. Pak's group professes friendship for the United States and a desire to eliminate official corruption and strengthen the national economy, after which it will purportedly return the government to civilian authority.

Pak, a former officer in the Japanese Army, joined the South Korean Army in 1946. Two years later he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for Communist activities, but he was recalled to service at the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. He is not known to have re-established his former Communist contacts.

The revolutionary junta has declared martial law and named a temporary all-military cabinet. All major population centers are believed quiet, and the city of Taegu reportedly has been returned to civilian authority. In Seoul, leftist newspapermen reportedly have been arrested and all suspected Communists ordered taken into custody.

Lt. Gen Yi Han-lim, commanding general of the First Army, which is deployed along the Demilitarized Zone facing North Korea, is holding his men in position and has declared that he "and all his officers and men support the military revolution."

Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong has accepted the chairmanship of Pak's Military Revolutionary Committee.

Chang said he did so with the understanding that there would be no mass punishment or violence against individuals, that a new cabinet would be formed composed of the best men available, and that troops would be withdrawn from the capital city "at the earliest opportunity." He noted that the committee agreed to the last condition provided troops remained until the position of the United States toward the coup was clear.

Following the takeover, Prime Minister Chang failed to rally any support for his administration. On 18 May he announced the resignation of his government over Seoul radio. This action has provided a cloak of legality for the coup and opened the way for transitional measures within a constitutional framework.

With the cooperation of President Yun Po-sun, Lt. Gen. Chang appears to be working for a transfer of power to a nonparty government composed of civilians and some military officers. There is some indication that Pak Chong-hui might agree to such an arrangement.

Initial Communist propaganda reaction reflected a lack of first-hand information on the coup--North Korea, for example, announced the event some six hours after it had taken place and then was forced to rely on Seoul press statements as news sources. Subsequently, however, Pyongyang denounced the coup leaders as "flagrantly reactionary" in a statement expressing hope that things may yet develop to the Communists' advantage. While hailing Chang Myon's downfall, the statement depicted South Korean troops as "deceived and misled" and urged them to take "internal problems firmly in their hands." Moscow and Peiping also have labeled the coup group reactionary.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

SOUTH KOREA

The ouster of Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong from the South Korean military junta on 3 July was a major move by Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui to establish his undisputed control of the present military regime. Chang, although largely a figurehead, was a potential rallying point for opposition to Pak.

Chang's removal was quickly followed by the arrest of three other members of the ruling Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) whose loyalty to Pak was doubtful and the removal from active duty of 40 general officers of the army, navy, air force, and marine corps.

The 40 officers removed were largely rear-echelon deadwood or had undesirable political affiliations. Some had been involved in past corruption, and the regime announced that all had "voluntarily" retired to make way for the promotion of junior officers.



However, there are indications Pak distrusts officers who are known to be pro-American and who he believes have independent channels to American influence.



In an obvious attempt to discredit the former civilian government, the regime has publicly accused former Prime Minister Chang Myon, who is South Korea's leading Roman Catholic layman, and 11 of his political associates of being Communist collaborators. A precedent has been established for similar action against intellectuals and students.

There are indications that Pak may next attempt to reduce the influence of the clique of younger field-grade officers in the SCNR who were prominent with him in the planning and execution of the 16 May coup.

Pak's brother-in-law, national security boss Lt. Col. Kim Chong-pil, is a leader of the impatient reform-minded younger element. As the head of the recently formed central intelligence agency, Kim has been moving to consolidate in police-state fashion all security affairs under his and presumably Pak's control. However, his loyalty to Pak is uncertain. Inasmuch as some of Pak's strongest support has come from the younger officer group, an attempt to reduce their power could precipitate a bitter and possibly violent power struggle within the junta.



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8 June 1961

Copy No. 283

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE



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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

SOUTH KOREA

Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui, the architect of last month's military coup in South Korea, appears to be moving cautiously to consolidate his control of the ruling junta. He reportedly will become chairman of the seven-man Standing Committee that is likely to emerge as the focal point of power in the unwieldy 32-member Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR). Pak's intelligence chief, Lt. Col. Kim Chong-pil, has seized government dossiers containing information compromising potential opponents, including SCNR chairman Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong.

On 6 May the Supreme Council announced that Chang had resigned as army chief of staff, defense minister, and martial law commander but would continue as chairman of the Supreme Council and chief of cabinet. The latter posts have little real power. According to a well-placed source, Chang was downgraded because of his initial hesitation to support the coup, the belief that the United States regarded him as a figurehead, and the conviction among insurgent leaders that he was attempting to build up his personal power by appointing his supporters to important posts.

The regime also announced on 6 May that retired Lt. Gen. Sin Ung-kyun, former vice minister of defense and onetime ambassador to Turkey, and Lt. Gen. Kim Chong-o, would succeed Chang

as defense minister and army chief of staff respectively. Both are regarded as generally competent. Prior approval was obtained from the UN commander for Kim's appointment.

The Supreme Council on 6 June promulgated the law of Emergency Measures of National Reconstruction, which "legalizes" its usurpation of power and in effect suspends these provisions of the present constitution dealing with civil rights and the ousted National Assembly. The regime reportedly is considering the eventual adoption of a new constitution providing for a strong executive patterned on that of the French Fifth Republic.

At the same time, spokesmen for the regime have vigorously denounced public speculation on the timing of a return to civilian government. The managing editor and one reporter of Tonga Ilbo, South Korea's largest and most respected newspaper, were summarily arrested on 4 June for headlining President Yun Po-sun's "hopes for an early transfer of power" and implying that the President believed a return to civilian authority was desirable prior to the opening of the 16th UN General Assembly in September. The incident indicates the regime's hypersensitivity to the timing of such action and provides further evidence that the junta's limited relaxation of martial law and censorship is largely window dressing. [REDACTED]

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16 May 1961



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

16 May 1961

DAILY BRIEF

*South Korea: (Information available as of 0500 EDT)

The only military units thus far identified with the military coup staged in Seoul in the early morning hours of 16 May are elements of the South Korean Second Army and some marine units. The rest of the army, the air force, and most navy elements reportedly have not thus far participated in the revolutionary activity; which way they will throw their support is not clear. Although the "military revolutionary committee" set up shortly after the coup claims that it controls the entire country, and evidently does control the city of Seoul, and possibly Taegu, it is still questionable whether the coup leaders have sufficient support to retain power.

The "military revolutionary committee," which claims to be anti-Communist, pro-US, and pro-UN, has been issuing proclamations over the name of Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong. Early on 16 May Chang asked the commander of UN forces in Korea, US General Magruder, for the assistance of American forces in putting down the revolt, and the revolt leaders may be merely using his name. Chang has, however, since been in contact with the coup leaders, and his present position is not known; it is possible he is working for a compromise which would avoid further armed conflict. In any event, the real leader and chief planner of the coup appears to be Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui, deputy commander of the Second Army, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The whereabouts of Prime Minister Chang Myon is not known; but he apparently escaped when the coup leaders tried to capture him and is now in hiding. According to press reports, a number of other government officials are under house arrest in Seoul. [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~South Korea

Major General Pak Chong-hui was court-martialed in 1948 on charges of being a Communist and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. At the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, he was recalled to service, and subsequently was pardoned because of his war record. He is not known to have re-established contacts with the Communists or to have been connected with South Korean leftist groups since 1948. However, because of alleged efforts to stir up discontent among officer elements following the revolt which toppled Rhee in April 1960, there was some question of his loyalty and whether he would soon be dropped from the Army.

The South Korean Second Army is largely composed of training and logistical units. It is not known whether units of the First Army--South Korea's combat ready force deployed along the Demilitarized Zone facing North Korea--support the uprising. First Army support for the coup could ensure its success. Although a proclamation of the "revolutionary committee" has named the First Army commanding general Yi Han-lim as "martial law commander" in the front line areas,

In a six point proclamation the insurgents, who have proclaimed martial law, have announced that they intend to strengthen anti-Communist measures, observe the UN charter, wipe out government corruption, rehabilitate the economy, work for Korean unification, and eventually return the government to civilian authority when their mission is accomplished. However, [redacted] Pak and his supporters had no definite plans for administering the government after they seized power. There also were indications that the Pak group was discontented over the loss of the privileged position enjoyed by the military under the Rhee regime. In the year since Rhee's ouster, many senior officers have been cashiered from the service, a civilian committee has been set up to investigate military affairs, and the press has been permitted to criticise the armed forces.

Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong was one of those widely criticized in the press for his support of the Rhee regime and accused of acquiring an illegal fortune through

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graft and corruption. Chang knew that Pak was planning a coup, but claimed last month that he lacked sufficient evidence to arrest the plotters. It is possible that Chang now may be playing both sides of the fence in an effort to assure his position whatever the outcome.

The North Korean regime has not yet commented on today's events in South Korea. The only Communist bloc reaction noted thus far has been a Moscow TASS item, and this essentially was a repeat of American press reports.

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25 May 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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South Korea: [The Watch Committee at its meeting on 24 May reached the following conclusion concerning South Korea.]
[Stability of the new government in South Korea is threatened by increasing factionalism in the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. Continued lack of response by ROK Army officers to CINCUNC direction, the relief of experienced commanders, and the failure of the military regime to restore to CINCUNC operational control over some elements of the ROK armed forces have at least temporarily impaired the UNC military posture in South Korea. While there is no evidence of North Korean military preparations to take advantage of the unsettled situation, dissension within the coup group could make the ROK increasingly susceptible to Communist propaganda and subversion.]

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25 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

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~~SECRET~~South Korea

The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) is continuing efforts to promote popular support for the military regime. The thoroughness of the campaign was indicated by the details announced in the South Korean press concerning the demonstration held in Taegu on 22 May. Organizers are reported to have required that each household provide one participant; factories were ordered closed so that all employees could attend; all businessmen were ordered to be present. The groups from each precinct were required to bring two placards displaying approved slogans. About 35,000 people were present at the Taegu demonstration, but the rally was described as lackluster. The American Embassy reports that although there is evidence of "increasing disenchantment" on the part of educated persons and students, general public attitudes range from "acceptance of the coup and military rule to bewildered confusion as to changes."

Of the persons reported arrested since the coup, over 600 are politicians, 540 are teachers, but only 70 are students, bearing out previous indications that the regime intended to handle the student problem cautiously. The arrest of the politicians muzzles such potential opposition leaders as former speaker of the lower house Kwak Sang-hun, and vice speaker So Min-ho. [Foreign Minister Kim Hyong-il told American Chargé Green yesterday he had discussed the matter of the arrest of political leaders with the SCNR and that he was making efforts to get at least the members of the Chang Myon cabinet returned to their homes soon. Lieutenant General Chang To-yong also told Chargé Green yesterday that political arrests would soon be stopped and that certain persons who had been arrested would be released after they had been screened and cleared; he said that members of the Chang cabinet, with one or two exceptions, would be taken from jail and put under house arrest.]

[Air Force chief Lieutenant General Kim Shin told the American air attaché in Seoul on 22 May that regime leaders Chang To-yong and Pak Chong-hui had informed him the military]

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[] officers under arrest might be shown some consideration when the situation was stabilized. However, he said that Lieutenant General Yi Han-ilm, former commander of the First ROK Army, was an exception and his punishment probably would be severe. Yi's loyalty is especially suspected by the new regime because of his delay in announcing full support for the coup.)

The revolutionary government extended its controls to the provincial and municipal levels on 24 May by appointing nine general officers as governors and nine lower-ranking officers as mayors of cities. Field artillery units involved in the coup are reported to have returned to their previous front-line positions, but the four other major units withdrawn from their tactical positions were still in Seoul late yesterday.

Depressed business conditions are continuing as a result of the limitation on bank withdrawals to approximately \$700 per month. This limitation has almost stopped the movement of goods from manufacturers to retailers, and retail business is largely limited to the purchase of daily essentials. Bank of Korea officials report that administrative confusion is mounting over handling financial transactions. They are pressing for the removal of the cash withdrawal limit, or at least for permission to clear checks without regard to the limit. Strict measures to control prices and the arrest of grain "profiteers" as well as the distribution of government-controlled grains have decreased the retail prices of rice and barley below the pre-coup level.

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25 May 1961

Copy No. 260

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW



This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE information; its security must be maintained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.

No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE



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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

SOUTH KOREA

The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, the military group which has control of the government in South Korea, is continuing to consolidate its position and to neutralize possible sources of opposition. However, there are indications that coup strongman Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui is becoming increasingly displeased with Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong, who is believed to favor a relatively early return to civilian government. Should Chang be forced out of the ruling junta, the regime would probably be strongly influenced by junior officers who desire an abrupt break with the past and an indefinite period of military rule.

The retention of President Yun Po-sun as chief of state has given the insurgent government a semblance of constitutionality. Government ministries have been reopened and a new all-military cabinet appointed. However, administrative and technical talent is scarce, and most of those who qualify for important positions are tainted by association with either the Chang Myon or Rhee administrations.

The shortage of capable senior personnel is particularly apparent in the economic field. The regime has taken stopgap measures to prevent a serious dislocation of the economy, but there are indications of business stagnation. Bank of Korea officials report that mounting administrative confusion is impeding economic activity.

The new government is committed to improve living conditions. Unless it can fulfill its economic promises, it probably will experience the same public antipathy as the Chang administration.

Apprehension is developing among educated civilians over

the repressive tactics of the military rulers. Political parties and organizations have been ordered abolished, and most members of the former administration have been placed under house arrest or imprisoned. A nationwide roundup of all leftists and suspected Communists is under way. According to local press reports, between 3,000 and 4,000 persons, many of them probably hoodlums and criminals, have been seized. Strict press and radio censorship has been imposed, and many persons are reportedly listening to Communist broadcasts from Pyongyang for news of events in South Korea.

Asian Communists, whose cautious initial reaction to the coup suggested a lack of first-hand information, have now taken the measure of Seoul's new leaders, and hostile propaganda has mounted steadily during the past week. Peiping's People's Daily charged in an editorial of 21 May that the US stage-managed the coup to maintain its "colonial rule."

Speaking at a rally of 200,000 in Pyongyang on 20 May, North Korean Vice Premier Kim Il called on the South Korean population to smash the coup; Pyongyang earlier had urged all South Korean military personnel to resist the coup leaders. The North Koreans have used the disturbed situation to renew their call for reunification, claiming that only by joining with the "self-sufficient" economy of the North can South Korea solve its economic problems.

While there is no evidence of North Korean military preparations to take advantage of the unsettled situation, dissension within the coup group could make South Korea increasingly susceptible to Communist propaganda and subversion.

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24 May 1961

Copy No. C 79

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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South Korea: Major General Pak Chong-hui, actual leader of the military revolt, informed General Carter Magruder, United Nations commander, on 23 May that the new government desires to return its armed forces to UN control. He added, however, that security considerations in Seoul currently prevent compliance with orders of the United Nations Command that troops removed from the combat area during the coup be returned to their positions.

[Besides wanting to retain in Seoul troops on whom he can rely, Pak's temporizing may be the result of a split within the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. The split is apparently between a moderate group led by Lieutenant General Chang To-yong, army chief of staff and head of the new cabinet, and a larger group, led by Pak and Marine Corps Commandant Kim Yun-kun, which is attempting to expand its military control over all aspects of national life. There are reports of dissatisfaction among army colonels who, along with General Pak, planned and executed the coup but who were subsequently denied cabinet posts in favor of general officers who joined the revolt belatedly.]

OK

Mass arrests continue, including those of high military officers and the speaker of the house of representatives, Kwak Sang-hun, who returned to Korea on 22 May from a visit to Washington. Official efforts to marshal student and veterans' demonstrations in favor of the new government have met with unenthusiastic response. (Backup, Page 3)

24 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

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South Korean Situation

[Elements of the 5th and 12th Infantry Divisions, which had been serving as reserve units on the northern border, and three field artillery battalions from the Sixth Corps, also in the same area, were withdrawn to the Seoul area shortly after the coup on 16 May. These units, plus rear-area marine and army airborne forces which actually carried out the coup, remain in or near the city. American military observers point out that the withdrawal of these forces has seriously weakened the combat front, particularly in regard to artillery support.]

[The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) has arrested two additional brigadiers, one a front-line division commander, and three colonels. Thus far, however, the SCNR has dealt leniently with Second Army Commander and former Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Choe Kyong-nok, who did not support the coup and temporarily blocked a military takeover in the city of Taegu. Choe has been relieved of command and ordered to proceed unescorted to army headquarters in Seoul.]

The nationwide crackdown continues; military tribunals have been established throughout the country to handle "murder, arson, and rebellion, disturbances, and other criminal cases" except those which were being processed by civilian courts. Reserve legal officers have been recalled to the army, presumably to try such cases. Reserve medical officers who were released prior to completion of military service also have been recalled. The SCNR has issued an order authorizing the suspension of newspapers and other publications, and one unconfirmed report indicates that 75 of the nation's 110 newspapers have been closed. Radio listeners are reported turning to Pyongyang broadcasts for "uncensored news."

President Yun Po-sun, according to his personal secretary who talked with an American Embassy officer on 22 May, believes that a return to civilian authority is imperative and that the longer the junta remains in power, the worse it will be for the South

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

24 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3

UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Korean Army. Yun sees long military rule increasing factionalism in the army and further weakening military discipline. He believes that there should be a return to civilian authority within a maximum of six months under a strong presidential system, but claims he is not thinking of himself as a candidate.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

24 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

SOUTH KOREA

South Korea's revolutionary leaders are providing increasing evidence that they envision an extended period of military rule. The regime is moving to bring all social and political organizations under its control and appears to be moving toward a controlled economy. Brigadier General Kim Yun-kun, commander of the marine unit which participated in the coup and a member of the ruling Supreme Council for National Construction, has stated that the junta intends to develop a group of young civilian leaders to whom it will give control of the government "possibly after two years."

Factional differences within the junta leadership are much in evidence, and lines of command between moderate senior officers and their more rash juniors are becoming increasingly uncertain. Tension between Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong and coup strongman Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui may be approaching a climax, with the ouster of one or the other from the ruling junta reported possible before the end of the month. Chang is credited with being a moderating influence on the insurgent leadership and is believed to favor a relatively early return to civilian government.

The clique of young colonels surrounding Pak favor prolonged military rule. The Supreme Council has been expanded and reorganized to provide them with greater representation. As a group, the colonels are extremely nationalistic and eager to undertake extensive reforms but they lack positive plans or administrative training. Should the regime fail to win public

support, these junior officers probably will push for increasingly repressive measures against any opposition.

Foreign Minister Kim Hong-il informed the American chargé on 27 May that the regime was drafting a "provisional" constitution to "legalize" the transfer of power to the Supreme Council. The "provisional" constitution--which may be dignified by a popular referendum--is intended to provide a legal basis for the extraconstitutional actions of the regime while preserving the appearance of continuity of government. The military leaders fear that unless such continuity is maintained--the Rhee government was recognized by the UN resolutions of 1950 and 1951--Seoul's claim to be the only legitimate Korean government will appear no more valid than that of Pyongyang.

Generals and one admiral have been appointed governors of all provinces and mayor of Seoul. The regime is seeking some 500 field officers to staff national and local government administrative posts down to and including the county level. Former Lieutenant General Kang Mun-ping--a follower of the proposed ambassador to the United States, retired General Chong Il-kwon--has been ordered to organize an extreme right-wing veterans' group to support the revolutionary government.

Twelve leading businessmen accused of accumulating "illegal fortunes" have been ordered arrested, possibly as a sop to public economic and social discontent.

the coup has restored police morale,

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
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

shattered by the fall of the Rhee government last year. The police can now concentrate on their normal law-enforcement duties, since military intelligence organs are largely taking over the investigation of domestic political activities.

Public reaction to the new regime continues to be largely passive, with known opponents reluctant to speak up for fear of possible repression. Students, who toppled the Rhee government in 1960, appear to be

about evenly divided for and against the coup. Many have been impressed by the speed and efficiency of the military in moving to clean up government corruption and other obvious manifestations of bureaucratic inefficiency. Some, however, are becoming increasingly concerned over limitations placed on academic freedom. Should repressions continue, student elements may be moved to take bolder action calling for a return to civilian government.

[Redacted]



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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

2 March 2011

Neil J. Berman, Esq.
109 College Avenue
Somerville, MA 02144

Reference: F-2010-00766 / F-2010-00767

Dear Mr. Berman:

This acknowledges receipt of your 11 February 2011 letter, sent on behalf of your client, Dr. George Katsiaficas, requesting an estimated response time concerning his 4 March 2010 Freedom of Information Act requests for records regarding "the assassination of the South Korean President Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979 in Seoul, South Korea" and "the coup d'etat of May 16, 1961 in South Korea through which General Park Chung-hee seized power."

Our response time is unfortunately predicated on the number and complexity of the requests we receive. Even when a request reaches the top of the queue, we must go through the time-consuming task of reviewing each and every document, assuming documents are in fact found. This process is necessary in order to fulfill the statutory obligation this agency has to protect intelligence sources and methods and other sensitive information.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Susan Viscuso", with a long, sweeping horizontal line extending to the right.

Susan Viscuso
Information and Privacy Coordinator



Washington, D.C. 20505

29 March 2011

George Katsiaficas, Ph.D.
Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Wentworth Institute of Technology
550 Huntington Avenue
Boston, MA 02115

Reference: F-2010-00766

Dear Dr. Katsiaficas:

This is a final response to your 4 March 2010 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records regarding "the coup d'etat of May 16, 1961 in South Korea through which General Park Chung-hee seized power." We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431, as amended. Our processing included a search for records as described in our 8 April 2010 acceptance letter existing through the date of that letter.

We completed a thorough search for records responsive to your request and located 11 documents, consisting of 29 pages, which we can release in segregable form with deletions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). Additional material was determined to be currently and properly classified and must be withheld in its entirety on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant statute is the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 403, as amended, e.g., Section 6, which exempts from the disclosure requirement information pertaining to the organization, functions, including those related to the protection of intelligence sources and methods, names, official titles, salaries, and numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. Copies of the documents and an explanation of exemptions are enclosed. As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 45 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Susan Viscuso", written in a cursive style.

Susan Viscuso
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

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Common Sense Legal Counseling

Attorney Neil J Berman

109 College Avenue
Somerville, MA 02144
(617) 628-1563 phone
(617) 776-0074 fax
e-mail: njberman2@juno.com

May 9, 2011

Agency Release Panel
C/O Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington DC
20505

Re: FOIA requests of George Katsiaficas dated March 4, 2010

Dear Agency Release Panel:

I am writing to appeal the response of the Information and Privacy Coordinator to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") Request of my client, Dr. George Katsiaficas dated March 29, 2011. My client and I are dissatisfied with the response for the following reasons and request that the response be supplemented in an expedited manner.

The response, over 1 year after the requests (one for records related to the coup d'etat of May 16, 1961 in South Korea in which General Park Chung-hee seized power and the second concerning the assassination of General Park on October 26, 1979), consisted of pages from various Central Intelligence Bulletins, Central Intelligence Weekly Summaries, Current Intelligence Weekly Reviews from 1961.

These documents were unresponsive and insufficient in three ways.

- 1) There is no source material at all, no actual Agency reports or documents concerning the events subject to the FOIA request.
- 2) There is no response at all to the request for all agency communications between US Army officer James Hausman and General Park
- 3) There is no response at all to the request concerning the 1979 assassination of General Park

Therefore, my client hereby requests that the Agency review and supplement the response released March 29, 2011. Please include original material relevant to both the May 16, 1961 coup d'etat including all contact between the Agency (and in particular Agency knowledge of communications between James Hausman and Park Chung-hee) and original reports leading up to and following the coup. Please also include original material concerning the October 26, 1979 assassination of Park Chung-hee including reports concerning Agency contact with the assassin

MAY 17 2011

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(Korean Central Agency chairman Kim Jae-kyu) and all information leading up to and following the assassination.

Thank you in advance for your review and supplemental response. Please feel free to contact me concerning this matter at any time.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Neil J. Berman", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Neil J Berman, Esq.

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Neil J Bernan
Common Sense Legal Counseling
109 College Avenue
Somerville MA 02144


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
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Agency Release Panel
C/O Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington DC



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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

Mr. Neil Berman, Esq.
Common Sense Legal Counseling
109 College Avenue
Somerville, MA 02144

AUG 18 2011

Reference: F-2010-00766

Dear Mr. Berman:

We received your 9 May 2011 letter on 17 May 2011 appealing, on behalf of your client, Dr. George Katsiaficas, our 29 March 2011 final response to Dr. Katsiaficas's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records regarding "the coup d'etat of May 16, 1961 in South Korea through which General Park Chung-hee seized power."

Your appeal has been accepted and arrangements will be made for its consideration by the appropriate members of the Agency Release Panel. You will be advised of the determinations made.

In order to afford requesters the most equitable treatment possible, we have adopted the policy of handling appeals on a first-received, first-out basis. Despite our best efforts, the large number of appeals that CIA receives has created unavoidable processing delays making it unlikely that we can respond within 20 working days. In view of this, some delay in our reply must be expected, but every reasonable effort will be made to respond as soon as possible.

Regarding Dr. Katsiaficas's request for "the assassination of the South Korean President Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979 in Seoul, South Korea," as previously indicated in our letter dated 8 April 2010, was assigned the reference number F-2010-00767 and is still being processed. Therefore, this portion of the request is not being considered in the appeal of F-2010-00766.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Susan Viscuso".

Susan Viscuso
Information and Privacy Coordinator

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

20 July 2012

George Katsiaficas, Ph.D.
Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Wentworth Institute of Technology
550 Huntington Avenue
Boston, MA 02115

Reference: F-2010-00767

Dear Dr. Katsiaficas:

This is a final response to your 4 March 2010 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for records regarding **“the assassination of the South Korean President Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979 in Seoul, South Korea.”** We processed your request in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, as amended, and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431, as amended. Our processing included a search for records as described in our 8 April 2010 acceptance letter. In reference to your request that we search for DIA and U.S. government documents, as we discussed in an April 2012 phone conversation, we agreed that our search would be limited to CIA records.

We completed a thorough search for records responsive to your request and located the enclosed four documents, consisting of 10 pages, which we can release in segregable form with deletions made on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). Additional material was determined to be currently and properly classified and must be withheld in its entirety on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and/or (b)(3). An explanation of exemptions is enclosed. Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant statute is the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 403, as amended, e.g., Section 6, which exempts from the disclosure requirement information pertaining to the organization, functions, including those related to the protection of intelligence sources and methods, names, official titles, salaries, and numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 45 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Michele Meeks".

Michele Meeks
Information and Privacy Coordinator

Enclosures

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

19 February 2014

Mr. Neil Berman, Esq.
Common Sense Legal Counseling
109 College Avenue
Sommerville, MA 02144

Reference: F-2010-00766

Dear Mr. Berman:


This responds to your 11 May 2011 letter, on behalf of your client, Dr. George Katsiaficas, appealing our 29 March 2011 final response to his Freedom of Information Act request for records regarding "the coup d'etat of May 16, 1961 in South Korea through which General Park Chung-hee seized power."

The Agency Release Panel (ARP) has determined that the portions previously withheld from the eleven documents must continue to be protected from release on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). The ARP also determined that the material denied in its entirety is currently and properly classified and must continue to be protected from release on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). Exemption (b)(3) pertains to information exempt from disclosure by statute. The relevant statute is the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 403g, as amended, Section 6, which exempts from the disclosure requirement information pertaining to the organization and functions, including those related to the protection of intelligence sources and methods.

Therefore, in accordance with Agency regulations set forth in part 1900 of title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the ARP fully denied your client's appeal on the basis of FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3). In accordance with the provisions of the FOIA, your client has the right to seek judicial review of this determination in a United States district court. Alternatively, the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) offers mediation services to resolve disputes between FOIA requesters and federal agencies. Using services offered by OGIS does not affect your client's right to pursue litigation. For more information, including how to contact OGIS, please consult its website, <http://ogis/archives.gov>.

As part of our examination of your client's appeal, we located two documents that may interest Dr. Katsiaficas. Please be advised these documents were released as part of another declassification program. Your client cannot appeal the excisions made in documents C00388076 and C02572631 as part of this FOIA request, but Dr. Katsiaficas may ask that one or both be re-reviewed as part of a new submission.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Michele Meeks". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.


Michele Meeks
Executive Secretary
Agency Release Panel

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3 June 1961



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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South Korea: The revolutionary Supreme Council for National Reconstruction voted on 2 June to relieve Lieutenant General Chang To-yong of his substantive posts--army chief of staff, minister of national defense, and martial law commander, [redacted] Chang for the time being will retain the titular post of chairman of the Supreme Council. The move allegedly results from Chang's procrastination in supporting the coup during its early hours on 16 May, the council's belief that Chang is regarded by US officials as lacking real authority, and the conviction among the revolutionary leaders that Chang has been attempting to build up his personal power by appointing to important posts officers loyal to him. [redacted] new appointees to the positions vacated by Chang would be selected within five days. The appointment of the new army chief of staff will reportedly be made after prior consultation with the UN commander, General Magruder.

Chang had been credited with exercising a moderating influence on the regime and was believed to favor a relatively early return to civilian government. The reduction of Chang's influence will enhance that of the young colonels surrounding Major General Pak Chong-hui. This group is strongly nationalistic and eager to undertake extensive reforms but lacks positive plans or the experience to administer the government. They are likely to push for increasingly repressive measures, particularly in the event the regime fails to win wide public support. [redacted]

3 June 61

DAILY BRIEF

iii

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USSR: An authoritative Pravda article on 2 June reiterated current Soviet views on Berlin and emphasized that the attitude toward a German peace settlement is the "touchstone of sincerity and peacefulness for any politician, any state." This apparently was in response to the announcement that the President and General de Gaulle had agreed on action to maintain Western rights in Berlin. Pravda also warned that the Soviet Union has no intention of tolerating the existing situation or of being intimidated by press accounts of Western military plans for "saving" West Berlin. [A number of bloc officials have adopted the line [redacted] that Khrushchev will be seeking a definite commitment for new negotiations, and if this fails the USSR will be "obliged" to sign a separate peace treaty. East German party chief Ulbricht in a 1 June public interview claimed he could state "unambiguously" that a peace treaty would be concluded in the "foreseeable future." [redacted]

[redacted] while Khrushchev agree to a foreign ministers' conference if the US proposed it. [redacted] Khrushchev was considering making a "very favorable" proposal to bring about agreement on a nuclear test ban? [redacted]

East Germany - USSR: The unprecedented scope of the Soviet - East German economic protocol, signed on 30 May, is [redacted]

3 June 61

DAILY BRIEF

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

SOUTH KOREA

The dominant position of Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui, the generally acknowledged leader of the South Korean military junta, is emphasized by his assumption on 9 June of the chairmanship of the standing committee of the ruling Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR). In addition to the chairman, the standing committee is composed of the heads of the seven committees covering the general areas of government administration and appears likely to become the focal point of power within the SCNR.

There is considerable evidence, however, that Pak's authority is circumscribed by factional divisions within the junta. Recent voting patterns in the 32-member Supreme Council reveal three primary groupings, with most junior officers looking to Lt. Col. Kim Chong-pil for leadership. Kim is the intelligence and security boss for the regime but is not a member of the Supreme Council. As SCNR members are presently identified, Pak is supported by 15, Kim by 10, and SCNR chairman Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong by 5. Kim has reportedly been associated with Pak since the earliest stages of the coup, but recent information has raised some question as to his loyalty to Pak.

There have been indications that the regime will adopt a harsher policy toward high officials of the former government. Pak recently publicly charged a number of former ministers with Communist activities.

A number of former senior officers--such as retired General Chong Il-kwon, ambassador-designate to the United States--reportedly will be given diplomatic assignments to keep them out of the country. One exception, however, is retired Lt. Gen. Song Yo-chan, who is studying in the United States and has been named minister of defense to succeed Acting Minister Sin Ung-kyun. Song is credited with having avoided large-scale bloodshed when he was army chief of staff at the time of Rhee's ouster last year. He is noted for his efforts to combat military corruption and, although he was personally loyal to Rhee, is believed largely to have stayed out of politics.

The public at large remains generally passive toward the regime, but American observers see growing apprehension among educated urban elements. To develop support, the junta has announced the establishment of a nationwide national front movement designed to "inspire the nation with fresh spirit, encourage new life, and strengthen anti-Communist ideology." A mass rally held in Seoul on 12 June was scheduled to attract some 100,000 persons. However, a crowd of only 30,000 attended --mostly teen-age students and housemaids, according to press reports.

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23 May 1961

Copy No. C 80

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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South Korea: [South Korea's revolutionary government is still consolidating its power and neutralizing elements which might oppose it. Colonel Kim Chong-pil, who is reported to be the principal adviser of the coup strongman, Major General Pak Chong-hui, told an American official on 22 May that everyone involved in the new regime has been too busy with internal affairs to pay much attention to relationships with the United States. He asserted that the United States should not be concerned, since the revolutionary leadership was anti-Communist and pro-US. The officer said that this was true despite the resentment engendered by statements of American officials in Seoul on 16 May, which had urged support of the former Chang Myon government]

[The adviser to Pak admitted that military command principles in relation to the UN Command had been violated, but said that the intent was to make the relationship between South Korean military forces and the UN Command as close as in the past. He said the leadership feels that Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Chang To-yong has too many duties in the present arrangement--he is chairman of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, head of the cabinet, and minister of defense--and that a new chief of staff should be appointed.]

Interservice rivalries and tension between the senior and the more numerous junior officers of the revolutionary leadership are continuing. The marines and paratroops in Seoul are reported to have refused on 21 May to obey an order by Chang To-yong to return to their camps.

[] (Backup, Page 3)

23 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

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~~SECRET~~South Korea

Apprehension appears to be growing among civilians who originally supported the coup or were apathetic to the overthrow of the Chang Myon government over the adoption of increasingly repressive tactics by the revolutionary leaders. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] some 3,000 persons have been arrested, but it is unclear how many are hoodlums and criminals and how many are political offenders. Most newspapers have been forced to adopt a position of complete endorsement of the new regime and give a distorted picture of American reaction implying that Washington supports the revolution.

Meanwhile, new Foreign Minister Kim Hong-il appears to be attempting to allay American concern regarding the

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revolutionary government. At his first press conference Kim gave assurances that the new government's foreign policy will not differ basically from that of the Chang Myon administration. He added that negotiations would be continued for the normalization of South Korean - Japanese relations and that the new regime opposed the "march North" unification policy of the old Rhee government. Kim is a former South Korean ambassador to Nationalist China and a retired lieutenant general. He is believed to be strongly anti-Communist and to favor an authoritarian government similar to that of Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan.

Peiping's People's Daily, in an editorial of 21 May, claims the US "stage-managed the coup" and labels the coup leaders "fascist." Pyongyang has broadcast reports of atrocities allegedly perpetrated by US personnel and has depicted the coup as a US-sponsored effort to "force more unbearable calamities on the South Korean people."

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18 May 1961

Copy No. 264

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW



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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

SOUTH KOREA

A force of some 3,600 army troops and marines led by Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui, deputy commander of South Korea's Second Army, seized Seoul on 16 May and deposed the government of Prime Minister Chang Myon. Pak's group professes friendship for the United States and a desire to eliminate official corruption and strengthen the national economy, after which it will purportedly return the government to civilian authority.

Pak, a former officer in the Japanese Army, joined the South Korean Army in 1946. Two years later he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for Communist activities, but he was recalled to service at the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950. He is not known to have re-established his former Communist contacts.

The revolutionary junta has declared martial law and named a temporary all-military cabinet. All major population centers are believed quiet, and the city of Taegu reportedly has been returned to civilian authority. In Seoul, leftist newspapermen reportedly have been arrested and all suspected Communists ordered taken into custody.

Lt. Gen Yi Han-lim, commanding general of the First Army, which is deployed along the Demilitarized Zone facing North Korea, is holding his men in position and has declared that he "and all his officers and men support the military revolution."

Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong has accepted the chairmanship of Pak's Military Revolutionary Committee.

Chang said he did so with the understanding that there would be no mass punishment or violence against individuals, that a new cabinet would be formed composed of the best men available, and that troops would be withdrawn from the capital city "at the earliest opportunity." He noted that the committee agreed to the last condition provided troops remained until the position of the United States toward the coup was clear.

Following the takeover, Prime Minister Chang failed to rally any support for his administration. On 18 May he announced the resignation of his government over Seoul radio. This action has provided a cloak of legality for the coup and opened the way for transitional measures within a constitutional framework.

With the cooperation of President Yun Po-sun, Lt. Gen. Chang appears to be working for a transfer of power to a nonparty government composed of civilians and some military officers. There is some indication that Pak Chong-hui might agree to such an arrangement.

Initial Communist propaganda reaction reflected a lack of first-hand information on the coup--North Korea, for example, announced the event some six hours after it had taken place and then was forced to rely on Seoul press statements as news sources. Subsequently, however, Pyongyang denounced the coup leaders as "flagrantly reactionary" in a statement expressing hope that things may yet develop to the Communists' advantage. While hailing Chang Myon's downfall, the statement depicted South Korean troops as "deceived and misled" and urged them to take "internal problems firmly in their hands." Moscow and Peiping also have labeled the coup group reactionary.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

SOUTH KOREA

The ouster of Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong from the South Korean military junta on 3 July was a major move by Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui to establish his undisputed control of the present military regime. Chang, although largely a figurehead, was a potential rallying point for opposition to Pak.

Chang's removal was quickly followed by the arrest of three other members of the ruling Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) whose loyalty to Pak was doubtful and the removal from active duty of 40 general officers of the army, navy, air force, and marine corps.

The 40 officers removed were largely rear-echelon deadwood or had undesirable political affiliations. Some had been involved in past corruption, and the regime announced that all had "voluntarily" retired to make way for the promotion of junior officers.

However, there are indications Pak distrusts officers who are known to be pro-American and who he believes have independent channels to American influence.



In an obvious attempt to discredit the former civilian government, the regime has publicly accused former Prime Minister Chang Myon, who is South Korea's leading Roman Catholic layman, and 11 of his political associates of being Communist collaborators. A precedent has been established for similar action against intellectuals and students.

There are indications that Pak may next attempt to reduce the influence of the clique of younger field-grade officers in the SCNR who were prominent with him in the planning and execution of the 16 May coup.

Pak's brother-in-law, national security boss Lt. Col. Kim Chong-pil, is a leader of the impatient reform-minded younger element. As the head of the recently formed central intelligence agency, Kim has been moving to consolidate in police-state fashion all security affairs under his and presumably Pak's control. However, his loyalty to Pak is uncertain. Inasmuch as some of Pak's strongest support has come from the younger officer group, an attempt to reduce their power could precipitate a bitter and possibly violent power struggle within the junta.



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8 June 1961

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW



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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

SOUTH KOREA

Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui, the architect of last month's military coup in South Korea, appears to be moving cautiously to consolidate his control of the ruling junta. He reportedly will become chairman of the seven-man Standing Committee that is likely to emerge as the focal point of power in the unwieldy 32-member Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR). Pak's intelligence chief, Lt. Col. Kim Chong-pil, has seized government dossiers containing information compromising potential opponents, including SCNR chairman Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong.

On 6 May the Supreme Council announced that Chang had resigned as army chief of staff, defense minister, and martial law commander but would continue as chairman of the Supreme Council and chief of cabinet. The latter posts have little real power. According to a well-placed source, Chang was downgraded because of his initial hesitation to support the coup, the belief that the United States regarded him as a figurehead, and the conviction among insurgent leaders that he was attempting to build up his personal power by appointing his supporters to important posts.

The regime also announced on 6 May that retired Lt. Gen. Sin Ung-kyun, former vice minister of defense and onetime ambassador to Turkey, and Lt. Gen. Kim Chong-o, would succeed Chang

as defense minister and army chief of staff respectively. Both are regarded as generally competent. Prior approval was obtained from the UN commander for Kim's appointment.

The Supreme Council on 6 June promulgated the law of Emergency Measures of National Reconstruction, which "legalizes" its usurpation of power and in effect suspends these provisions of the present constitution dealing with civil rights and the ousted National Assembly. The regime reportedly is considering the eventual adoption of a new constitution providing for a strong executive patterned on that of the French Fifth Republic.

At the same time, spokesmen for the regime have vigorously denounced public speculation on the timing of a return to civilian government. The managing editor and one reporter of Tonga Ilbo, South Korea's largest and most respected newspaper, were summarily arrested on 4 June for headlining President Yun Po-sun's "hopes for an early transfer of power" and implying that the President believed a return to civilian authority was desirable prior to the opening of the 16th UN General Assembly in September. The incident indicates the regime's hypersensitivity to the timing of such action and provides further evidence that the junta's limited relaxation of martial law and censorship is largely window dressing. []

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
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16 May 1961



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

16 May 1961

DAILY BRIEF

*South Korea: (Information available as of 0500 EDT)

The only military units thus far identified with the military coup staged in Seoul in the early morning hours of 16 May are elements of the South Korean Second Army and some marine units. The rest of the army, the air force, and most navy elements reportedly have not thus far participated in the revolutionary activity; which way they will throw their support is not clear. Although the "military revolutionary committee" set up shortly after the coup claims that it controls the entire country, and evidently does control the city of Seoul, and possibly Taegu, it is still questionable whether the coup leaders have sufficient support to retain power.

The "military revolutionary committee," which claims to be anti-Communist, pro-US, and pro-UN, has been issuing proclamations over the name of Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong. Early on 16 May Chang asked the commander of UN forces in Korea, US General Magruder, for the assistance of American forces in putting down the revolt, and the revolt leaders may be merely using his name. Chang has, however, since been in contact with the coup leaders, and his present position is not known; it is possible he is working for a compromise which would avoid further armed conflict. In any event, the real leader and chief planner of the coup appears to be Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui, deputy commander of the Second Army, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The whereabouts of Prime Minister Chang Myon is not known; but he apparently escaped when the coup leaders tried to capture him and is now in hiding. According to press reports, a number of other government officials are under house arrest in Seoul. [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET~~South Korea

Major General Pak Chong-hui was court-martialed in 1948 on charges of being a Communist and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. At the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, he was recalled to service, and subsequently was pardoned because of his war record. He is not known to have re-established contacts with the Communists or to have been connected with South Korean leftist groups since 1948. However, because of alleged efforts to stir up discontent among officer elements following the revolt which toppled Rhee in April 1960, there was some question of his loyalty and whether he would soon be dropped from the Army.

The South Korean Second Army is largely composed of training and logistical units. It is not known whether units of the First Army--South Korea's combat ready force deployed along the Demilitarized Zone facing North Korea--support the uprising. First Army support for the coup could ensure its success. Although a proclamation of the "revolutionary committee" has named the First Army commanding general Yi Han-lim as "martial law commander" in the front line areas,

In a six point proclamation the insurgents, who have proclaimed martial law, have announced that they intend to strengthen anti-Communist measures, observe the UN charter, wipe out government corruption, rehabilitate the economy, work for Korean unification, and eventually return the government to civilian authority when their mission is accomplished. However, [redacted] Pak and his supporters had no definite plans for administering the government after they seized power. There also were indications that the Pak group was discontented over the loss of the privileged position enjoyed by the military under the Rhee regime. In the year since Rhee's ouster, many senior officers have been cashiered from the service, a civilian committee has been set up to investigate military affairs, and the press has been permitted to criticise the armed forces.

Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong was one of those widely criticized in the press for his support of the Rhee regime and accused of acquiring an illegal fortune through

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graft and corruption. Chang knew that Pak was planning a coup, but claimed last month that he lacked sufficient evidence to arrest the plotters. It is possible that Chang now may be playing both sides of the fence in an effort to assure his position whatever the outcome.

The North Korean regime has not yet commented on today's events in South Korea. The only Communist bloc reaction noted thus far has been a Moscow TASS item, and this essentially was a repeat of American press reports.

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25 May 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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South Korea: [The Watch Committee at its meeting on 24 May reached the following conclusion concerning South Korea.]
[Stability of the new government in South Korea is threatened by increasing factionalism in the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. Continued lack of response by ROK Army officers to CINCUNC direction, the relief of experienced commanders, and the failure of the military regime to restore to CINCUNC operational control over some elements of the ROK armed forces have at least temporarily impaired the UNC military posture in South Korea. While there is no evidence of North Korean military preparations to take advantage of the unsettled situation, dissension within the coup group could make the ROK increasingly susceptible to Communist propaganda and subversion.]

(Backup, Page 4)

25 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

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~~SECRET~~South Korea

The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) is continuing efforts to promote popular support for the military regime. The thoroughness of the campaign was indicated by the details announced in the South Korean press concerning the demonstration held in Taegu on 22 May. Organizers are reported to have required that each household provide one participant; factories were ordered closed so that all employees could attend; all businessmen were ordered to be present. The groups from each precinct were required to bring two placards displaying approved slogans. About 35,000 people were present at the Taegu demonstration, but the rally was described as lackluster. The American Embassy reports that although there is evidence of "increasing disenchantment" on the part of educated persons and students, general public attitudes range from "acceptance of the coup and military rule to bewildered confusion as to changes."

Of the persons reported arrested since the coup, over 600 are politicians, 540 are teachers, but only 70 are students, bearing out previous indications that the regime intended to handle the student problem cautiously. The arrest of the politicians muzzles such potential opposition leaders as former speaker of the lower house Kwak Sang-hun, and vice speaker So Min-ho. [Foreign Minister Kim Hyong-il told American Chargé Green yesterday he had discussed the matter of the arrest of political leaders with the SCNR and that he was making efforts to get at least the members of the Chang Myon cabinet returned to their homes soon. Lieutenant General Chang To-yong also told Chargé Green yesterday that political arrests would soon be stopped and that certain persons who had been arrested would be released after they had been screened and cleared; he said that members of the Chang cabinet, with one or two exceptions, would be taken from jail and put under house arrest.]

[Air Force chief Lieutenant General Kim Shin told the American air attaché in Seoul on 22 May that regime leaders Chang To-yong and Pak Chong-hui had informed him the military]

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[redacted] officers under arrest might be shown some consideration when the situation was stabilized. However, he said that Lieutenant General Yi Han-ilm, former commander of the First ROK Army, was an exception and his punishment probably would be severe. Yi's loyalty is especially suspected by the new regime because of his delay in announcing full support for the coup.)

The revolutionary government extended its controls to the provincial and municipal levels on 24 May by appointing nine general officers as governors and nine lower-ranking officers as mayors of cities. Field artillery units involved in the coup are reported to have returned to their previous front-line positions, but the four other major units withdrawn from their tactical positions were still in Seoul late yesterday.

Depressed business conditions are continuing as a result of the limitation on bank withdrawals to approximately \$700 per month. This limitation has almost stopped the movement of goods from manufacturers to retailers, and retail business is largely limited to the purchase of daily essentials. Bank of Korea officials report that administrative confusion is mounting over handling financial transactions. They are pressing for the removal of the cash withdrawal limit, or at least for permission to clear checks without regard to the limit. Strict measures to control prices and the arrest of grain "profiteers" as well as the distribution of government-controlled grains have decreased the retail prices of rice and barley below the pre-coup level.

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25 May 1961

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW



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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

SOUTH KOREA

The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, the military group which has control of the government in South Korea, is continuing to consolidate its position and to neutralize possible sources of opposition. However, there are indications that coup strongman Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui is becoming increasingly displeased with Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong, who is believed to favor a relatively early return to civilian government. Should Chang be forced out of the ruling junta, the regime would probably be strongly influenced by junior officers who desire an abrupt break with the past and an indefinite period of military rule.

The retention of President Yun Po-sun as chief of state has given the insurgent government a semblance of constitutionality. Government ministries have been reopened and a new all-military cabinet appointed. However, administrative and technical talent is scarce, and most of those who qualify for important positions are tainted by association with either the Chang Myon or Rhee administrations.

The shortage of capable senior personnel is particularly apparent in the economic field. The regime has taken stopgap measures to prevent a serious dislocation of the economy, but there are indications of business stagnation. Bank of Korea officials report that mounting administrative confusion is impeding economic activity.

The new government is committed to improve living conditions. Unless it can fulfill its economic promises, it probably will experience the same public antipathy as the Chang administration.

Apprehension is developing among educated civilians over

the repressive tactics of the military rulers. Political parties and organizations have been ordered abolished, and most members of the former administration have been placed under house arrest or imprisoned. A nationwide roundup of all leftists and suspected Communists is under way. According to local press reports, between 3,000 and 4,000 persons, many of them probably hoodlums and criminals, have been seized. Strict press and radio censorship has been imposed, and many persons are reportedly listening to Communist broadcasts from Pyongyang for news of events in South Korea.

Asian Communists, whose cautious initial reaction to the coup suggested a lack of first-hand information, have now taken the measure of Seoul's new leaders, and hostile propaganda has mounted steadily during the past week. Peiping's People's Daily charged in an editorial of 21 May that the US stage-managed the coup to maintain its "colonial rule."

Speaking at a rally of 200,000 in Pyongyang on 20 May, North Korean Vice Premier Kim Il called on the South Korean population to smash the coup; Pyongyang earlier had urged all South Korean military personnel to resist the coup leaders. The North Koreans have used the disturbed situation to renew their call for reunification, claiming that only by joining with the "self-sufficient" economy of the North can South Korea solve its economic problems.

While there is no evidence of North Korean military preparations to take advantage of the unsettled situation, dissension within the coup group could make South Korea increasingly susceptible to Communist propaganda and subversion.

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24 May 1961



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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South Korea: Major General Pak Chong-hui, actual leader of the military revolt, informed General Carter Magruder, United Nations commander, on 23 May that the new government desires to return its armed forces to UN control. He added, however, that security considerations in Seoul currently prevent compliance with orders of the United Nations Command that troops removed from the combat area during the coup be returned to their positions.

[Besides wanting to retain in Seoul troops on whom he can rely, Pak's temporizing may be the result of a split within the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. The split is apparently between a moderate group led by Lieutenant General Chang To-yong, army chief of staff and head of the new cabinet, and a larger group, led by Pak and Marine Corps Commandant Kim Yun-kun, which is attempting to expand its military control over all aspects of national life. There are reports of dissatisfaction among army colonels who, along with General Pak, planned and executed the coup but who were subsequently denied cabinet posts in favor of general officers who joined the revolt belatedly.]

OK

Mass arrests continue, including those of high military officers and the speaker of the house of representatives, Kwak Sang-hun, who returned to Korea on 22 May from a visit to Washington. Official efforts to marshal student and veterans' demonstrations in favor of the new government have met with unenthusiastic response. (Backup, Page 3)

24 May 61

DAILY BRIEF

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South Korean Situation

[Elements of the 5th and 12th Infantry Divisions, which had been serving as reserve units on the northern border, and three field artillery battalions from the Sixth Corps, also in the same area, were withdrawn to the Seoul area shortly after the coup on 16 May. These units, plus rear-area marine and army airborne forces which actually carried out the coup, remain in or near the city. American military observers point out that the withdrawal of these forces has seriously weakened the combat front, particularly in regard to artillery support.]

[The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) has arrested two additional brigadiers, one a front-line division commander, and three colonels. Thus far, however, the SCNR has dealt leniently with Second Army Commander and former Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Choe Kyong-nok, who did not support the coup and temporarily blocked a military takeover in the city of Taegu. Choe has been relieved of command and ordered to proceed unescorted to army headquarters in Seoul.]

The nationwide crackdown continues; military tribunals have been established throughout the country to handle "murder, arson, and rebellion, disturbances, and other criminal cases" except those which were being processed by civilian courts. Reserve legal officers have been recalled to the army, presumably to try such cases. Reserve medical officers who were released prior to completion of military service also have been recalled. The SCNR has issued an order authorizing the suspension of newspapers and other publications, and one unconfirmed report indicates that 75 of the nation's 110 newspapers have been closed. Radio listeners are reported turning to Pyongyang broadcasts for "uncensored news."

President Yun Po-sun, according to his personal secretary who talked with an American Embassy officer on 22 May, believes that a return to civilian authority is imperative and that the longer the junta remains in power, the worse it will be for the South

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Korean Army. Yun sees long military rule increasing factionalism in the army and further weakening military discipline. He believes that there should be a return to civilian authority within a maximum of six months under a strong presidential system, but claims he is not thinking of himself as a candidate.

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24 May 61 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 4

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

SOUTH KOREA

South Korea's revolutionary leaders are providing increasing evidence that they envision an extended period of military rule. The regime is moving to bring all social and political organizations under its control and appears to be moving toward a controlled economy. Brigadier General Kim Yun-kun, commander of the marine unit which participated in the coup and a member of the ruling Supreme Council for National Construction, has stated that the junta intends to develop a group of young civilian leaders to whom it will give control of the government "possibly after two years."

Factional differences within the junta leadership are much in evidence, and lines of command between moderate senior officers and their more rash juniors are becoming increasingly uncertain. Tension between Army Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Chang To-yong and coup strongman Maj. Gen. Pak Chong-hui may be approaching a climax, with the ouster of one or the other from the ruling junta reported possible before the end of the month. Chang is credited with being a moderating influence on the insurgent leadership and is believed to favor a relatively early return to civilian government.

The clique of young colonels surrounding Pak favor prolonged military rule. The Supreme Council has been expanded and reorganized to provide them with greater representation. As a group, the colonels are extremely nationalistic and eager to undertake extensive reforms but they lack positive plans or administrative training. Should the regime fail to win public

support, these junior officers probably will push for increasingly repressive measures against any opposition.

Foreign Minister Kim Hong-il informed the American chargé on 27 May that the regime was drafting a "provisional" constitution to "legalize" the transfer of power to the Supreme Council. The "provisional" constitution--which may be dignified by a popular referendum--is intended to provide a legal basis for the extraconstitutional actions of the regime while preserving the appearance of continuity of government. The military leaders fear that unless such continuity is maintained--the Rhee government was recognized by the UN resolutions of 1950 and 1951--Seoul's claim to be the only legitimate Korean government will appear no more valid than that of Pyongyang.

Generals and one admiral have been appointed governors of all provinces and mayor of Seoul. The regime is seeking some 500 field officers to staff national and local government administrative posts down to and including the county level. Former Lieutenant General Kang Mun-ping--a follower of the proposed ambassador to the United States, retired General Chong Il-kwon--has been ordered to organize an extreme right-wing veterans' group to support the revolutionary government.

Twelve leading businessmen accused of accumulating "illegal fortunes" have been ordered arrested, possibly as a sop to public economic and social discontent.

the coup has restored police morale,

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

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

shattered by the fall of the Rhee government last year. The police can now concentrate on their normal law-enforcement duties, since military intelligence organs are largely taking over the investigation of domestic political activities.

Public reaction to the new regime continues to be largely passive, with known opponents reluctant to speak up for fear of possible repression. Students, who toppled the Rhee government in 1960, appear to be

about evenly divided for and against the coup. Many have been impressed by the speed and efficiency of the military in moving to clean up government corruption and other obvious manifestations of bureaucratic inefficiency. Some, however, are becoming increasingly concerned over limitations placed on academic freedom. Should repressions continue, student elements may be moved to take bolder action calling for a return to civilian government.



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18 May 1961

CURRENT SITUATION IN SOUTH KOREA

1. A well-planned coup executed by some 3,600 army troops and marines in Seoul overthrew the government of Prime Minister Chang Myon on 15 May. The insurgents seized the Seoul radio station and broadcast orders over the name of Army Chief of Staff Lt. General Chang To-yong establishing martial law throughout the Nation.

2. The leader of the revolt is Major General Pak Chang-hui who still exercises the real power in the Military Revolutionary Committee government. Pak, a one-time officer in the Japanese army, was commissioned in the Korean army in 1946. He was court-martialed in 1948 on charges of being a Communist and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Pak was recalled to service at the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and subsequently pardoned because of his war record. He is not known to have re-established contacts with the Communists or to have been connected with South Korean leftist groups since 1948. Following the ouster of the Rhee regime, Pak was involved in the agitation of younger officers to rid the army of senior officers who allegedly had profited from their support of Rhee.

3. The coup leaders were able to establish control easily because of the absence of any resistance in Seoul and the public indifference or apathy shown in other areas. The prime minister went into hiding and made no effort to rally any forces against the coup. The Army Chief of Staff,

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DATE: JAN 2003

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General Chang To-yong, assumed a cautious role endeavoring to maintain a favorable position with the coup leaders and the American side. Chang still holds the spotlight as head of the Military Revolutionary Committee, but he is probably a figurehead.

4. President Yun Po-sun used his influence for a compromise that would provide a semblance of legality for the coup actions and put the government transition within a framework of constitutionality.

5. Prime Minister Chang Myon emerged from hiding on 18 May and broadcast that the martial law proclaimed by Lt. General Chang To-yong as chairman of the Military Revolutionary Committee was legal. He announced the resignation of his cabinet opening the way for transitional measures that would be legal under the Constitution. This significantly strengthens the political position of the committee.

6. The military base for the governing committee was secured on 17 May when the commander of the First Army Lt. General Yi Han-lim publicly declared his support of the coup. An unconfirmed report [redacted] say that Yi has been relieved of his command for failure to support the coup all the way. Lt. General Pak Lim-hang has been placed in command.

7. [redacted] an early return to civilian government is likely to permit extreme right-wing elements associated with the Rhee regime to return to power. The American embassy reports that the revolutionary presently lacks personnel capable of dealing with economic problems and has no real economic program. The embassy believes the committee is probably counting on former government officials with economic experience to fill the gap.

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8. The possibility of former Rhee officials gaining influence is indicated by a censored newspaper report on 17 May that a cabinet of elders had been established. This included Paek Nak-chun (George Paek), Yi Pom-sol, Pyon Yong-tae, Kim Hong-il, Paek Tu-chin and Song Yo-chan.

9. The revolutionary government is moving to enforce its anti-communist program. The staff of the leftist newspaper Minjok Ilbo and the editor of Minjuk Ilbo have been arrested. The arrest of all persons on a Communist Watch List--reported to comprise 70,000 persons, including families, friends and associates--has been ordered. A proclamation calls for all spies to surrender by 20 June under a promise of lenient treatment. After that date all spies that are apprehended will be given capital punishment.

10. Initial communist reaction betrayed a lack of information. Subsequent comment labelled the coup leaders reactionary and warned against US interference. There has been no evidence of any military reaction on the part of North Korea to the coup.

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Briefly Noted

Czechoslovakia as a Model for "Peaceful" Transition: The 40th Anniversary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party was hailed by the Communist World as the example par excellence of the "peaceful revolution" from capitalism to the completion of a fully "socialist" state. Its special significance as a "model" accounted for the importance accorded the Czech anniversary as compared with those of other parties which have been celebrated this year. Antonin Novotny, whose predelections for Stalinist methods are well-known, made a speech in which he claimed - with typical Communist disregard for fact - that the Czech party throughout its history had fought dogmatism-secretarianism as vigorously as it had Social-Democratic, right wing, and revisionist elements. In so doing, Novotny sought to convey the impression that the Czech party has freed itself from the the dogmatic addictions which characterized it in the past and to portray himself as a loyal and convinced supporter of Khrushchev's current policies. Notable by their absence from this felicitous gathering were representatives of the Communist parties of Albania and the Chinese People's Republic.

Trial of Hungarian Church Officials: On 7 June a show trial of eleven (11) Hungarian Church officials charged with anti-state activity began in Budapest. The trial is the climax of a campaign to neutralize the Hungarian Catholic Church which began in February and March with the arrest of large numbers (some estimates range as high as 3,000) of priests most of whom were probably released subsequently. All but one of the men on trial "admitted" charges that they had "recruited former students of Catholic schools and members of Catholic youth organizations banned by the government:" in an effort to set up a "Catholic elite youth corps" whose members would have taken over government posts in a "Christian republic." One priest, however, a Piarist monk, by the name of Odon Lenard, stoutly maintained that practices such as the writing of religious pamphlets and teaching youths the scriptures privately could not be classified as anti-state crimes. More trials of Catholic clergy may be forthcoming. For additional details see Press Comment and the Current Intelligence Digest.

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395. Aftermath of the Military Coup in Korea

Background: A force of some 3,600 Army troops and marines led by Major General Pak Cong-hui, Deputy Commander of South Korea's Second Army, seized Seoul on May 16 and deposed Prime Minister Chang Myon. The leaders of the successful coup have kept President Yun Po-sun as a legal facade while they have effectively superseded the Constitution with their own "basic law", set up a totally military "Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR)", a totally military cabinet, and a panel of civilian, academic advisors. The SCNR proclaimed that it would restore the government to civilian control after they have wiped out all forms of Communist subversion, eliminated official corruption, and strengthened the national economy. It abolished all political parties and many other organizations and imprisoned several thousand people; the Council's "basic law" permits a wide variety of actions which were previously illegal and also allows for much ex post facto action against former officeholders military leaders, businessmen, union leaders and others. The principal motivating force behind these actions appears to have been a group of field grade officers led by General Pak's brother-in-law, Lt. Col. Kim Cong p'il. The general public, including the students who had unseated the Rhee regime, unconvinced that the Chang regime had made significant progress on economic and anti-corruption measures, remained passive throughout. In the name of anti-communism and anti-corruption, however, the new regime has moved heavily against "progressivist" intellectuals -- e.g. the teachers' union, and has taken various puritanical measures against the general public, with an as yet unmeasurable long-term effect.

From the US point of view important characteristics of the new rulers of Korea are their nationalistic fervor, their impatience and their obvious inexperience in governing and in handling public relations both domestic and external. The prospect is that, although various factions within the military clique now ruling will continue to wage an internecine struggle for power, the current coup group will remain in the saddle for the foreseeable future. It is very unlikely that constitutional government and civilian rule will be restored in Korea in the next twelve months. The relatively independent attitude toward the US manifested by the new leaders, moreover, has presented a picture of great interest and obvious implications to military officers in Far Eastern countries -- e.g. Vietnam and Thailand. In addition, the seemingly anti-Japanese posture of at least some of the new leaders does not favor prospects of greater Free World strength in North East Asia. ROK moves for unification on terms advantageous to the Communists are less likely than heretofore but remain a possibility. Factors underlying this danger include: the radicalism of some of the younger coup officers and possible reactions by the general public to present repressive measures.

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396. Vietnam as an Example of "Peaceful Coexistence"

Background: The situation prevailing today in Vietnam is an excellent example of what is meant when the Communists refer to peaceful coexistence between countries having differing political and social systems. In an editorial on the Moscow Conference, in the Hanoi newspaper Hoc Tap it is stated that: "Peaceful coexistence is precisely a form of class struggle between two world systems, a struggle in the political, economic and ideological fields." *

Both in a report which Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Vietnam Workers' Party (Lao Dong Party, i. e. Communist Party), submitted to the Third National Congress of the Party in September 1960 and in a report which he presented to the Congress on the November 1960 Moscow Conference, he emphasized the need of overthrowing the Government of South Vietnam by force and pointed to the steps which have been taken to accomplish this. In outlining the two main tasks of Vietnam's revolution, Le Duan said that "the first consists in carrying out a socialist revolution in North Vietnam and the second in realizing the tasks of the national people's democratic revolution, by eradicating the colonial and semi-feudal regime in South Vietnam and realizing national reunification." He went on to explain that "for the past six years, the revolutionary movement in the South has been firmly maintained and developed. To insure the complete success of the revolutionary struggle in South Vietnam, our people there must strive to establish a united bloc of workers, peasants and soldiers and to bring into being a broad national united front with the worker-peasant alliance as the basis, directed against the US-Diem clique."

Referring to the Moscow Conference, Le Duan said: "The ultimate objective of Communist and workers parties is the construction of socialism in the world. The transition from capitalism to socialism is a result of the struggle between the socialist and capitalist systems, the result of socialist revolutions and national liberation revolutions. Thus, the transition from capitalism to socialism is a process of revolutionary and class struggle in the world as well as in each country. Under the condition that the world is divided into the socialist and capitalist systems, peaceful coexistence and competition is an objective necessity. It is an important form of the class struggle between socialism and capitalism on the international plane. Peaceful coexistence daily deepens the contradictions of imperialism and contributes to its disintegration thus creating favorable conditions for enlarging class struggles in capitalist countries and stepping up national liberation struggles in colonies and dependent countries."

Le Duan emphasizes the need to encourage revolt by explaining that "the
* In Communist lexicon "Peaceful Coexistence", the principle of which was developed by Lenin, means the establishment of a "breathing spell" (PEREDYSHKI) during which time the opposition would be lulled into a false sense of security while the Communists conduct their subversive activities to undermine the opposition. According to the Moscow Declaration "the policy of peaceful coexistence is a policy of mobilizing the masses and launching vigorous action against the enemies of peace."

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
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transition from capitalism to socialism will be carried on through anti-imperialist, socialist and national liberation revolutions. It is clear that the present era is not an era when capitalism has temporarily stabilized, when revolutionary struggles have temporarily subsided, or when capitalism will disappear into socialism gradually or peacefully. At present we have more advantageous conditions than ever to step up anti-imperialist revolutions. The struggle for achieving peaceful coexistence among countries of both systems and the development of revolutionary movements in capitalist countries are two closely connected aspects of the present struggle of the people of the world."

Le Duan's statements clearly illustrate the basic Communist understanding of peaceful coexistence as being merely a tactic which will serve to prevent any action on the part of the free world while the Communists continue to effect definite gains by means of subversive warfare.



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397. Toward a Communist Utopia - the Agro - City

Background: The establishment of the agricultural commune system in Communist China has perhaps overshadowed the trend toward larger state farming units (sovkhoses) in the Soviet Union and other Communist states. (Poland is a notable exception.) Moving from the collective farms (kolkhozes) to the sovkhoses is but a step toward the formation of even more "scientific" units, proposed by Khrushchev in the Stalin era (in March 1951) the agro-cities. Dormant for years, the scheme has recently been revived in the Soviet press. Khrushchev proposed concentrating villages into large urban-like settlements, which would contain large apartment buildings for housing the peasants (who would move - or, perhaps more accurately, be moved out of their individual farmsteads) and into dining halls, stores, small industries, and other features normally associated with urbanization. The former private plots of the collective farm members were to be replaced by small garden plots on the outskirts of the new towns where they could be tilled in common by the town's population. Already collectivization of the farmers is virtually complete in Bulgaria and East Germany; it is in its final stages in Czechoslovakia and Hungary; it is progressing in Rumania; however, it is getting virtually nowhere in Poland, where the Gomulka regime has chosen not to pursue it in face of the strong resistance of the Polish peasants. When collective farming has become a fait accompli, the next step is to merge the collectives into larger units - a process which effectively destroys the myth that the peasants control the collectives. In Eastern Europe the merging has so far been confined to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, but the Hungarian authorities have indicated that they are likely to follow as soon as they have brought the remaining private land under the common plow. Speaking at Kalinovka in the eastern Ukraine (his birthplace) in late 1958, Khrushchev said:

"I'm for moving people from the separate farmsteads and small settlements into attractive villages with modern, well-built houses and good streets and sidewalks so that all the conditions are created for a cultured life. Each one will have a school, a hospital, a maternity home, nurseries, and so forth... But this is not all. It is high time that the system switched on the run from the narrowly agrarian to the agrarian-industrial track. It is time the collective farms built their own mills and bakeries, creameries, canneries and sugar refineries and enterprises for the processing of flax and cotton and other types of local raw materials."

In their efforts to "build socialism", the Communists have had to reckon - both in practice and in theory - with large peasant populations whose habits and vital interests are quite different from those of industrial workers. Collective farms, in the Communist view, have provided a solution to one aspect of the urban-rural conflict, giving the government political and economic control of the peasantry. Large-scale socialized farming also offers an avenue to the Marxist utopia of a rationalized, scientific system in which differences between the town and the country. The new giant farms are one step toward that

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19 June 1961

398. UAR Reacts Strongly to Soviet Attacks

Background: The UAR, with surprisingly firm support from other Arab States (including Iraq), has reacted sharply to Soviet criticism of its alleged mistreatment of local Communists. Similar Soviet complaints have been voiced by the Soviets about the treatment of "patriots" (i. e. Communists) of Iraq. The current Soviet attacks are a renewal of those published in articles in the December 1960 issue of Problems of Peace and Socialism. The articles were not attributed to Khalid Bakdash, former leader of the Syrian Communist Party now in exile behind the iron curtain, but it is conjectured that he inspired and possibly wrote them. The official daily of Cairo, Al-Jumhuriyah, wrote on 6 June that Moscow's propaganda is putting the US'SR in the "imperialist camp" and added that if Soviet leaders believe they can impose their views on the UAR through the USSR-UAR trade agreements, "they feed on delusions." It also said that "from their recent attempt to exert pressure on us it may be readily seen that they have been inclined to interpret our positive neutralism as some sort of alignment with the camp they represent. In the light of this misconception they have also imagined that they have the right to demand from us the price of alignment and the price of submissive dependence. They obviously believed that unless we were willing to pay the price they would have the right to take us to task..." The Nationalist daily of Baghdad, Al Fajr Al Jadid, came to the support of the UAR in this propaganda battle with the USSR. In an editorial published on 7 June it states that Russia miscalculated the capability of UAR news media to return two blows for every one... Agents of Soviets do not represent Arab opinion, it points out, and Communist agents are not loyal Arab nationals but strangers... The attack on the UAR, it emphasized, for the sake of Soviet agents makes clear that Communists are loyal to no one but Russia. Some UAR commentators have speculated that the present Soviet attack has been timed to coincide with the preliminary conference of "non-aligned" nations in Cairo, originally proposed by President Tito of Yugoslavia (during a visit to Cairo) and President Nasser of the UAR. Included in the USSR attack was the allegation that two prominent Communists were arrested and killed in UAR prisons. One was Farajallah Helu, former Secretary of the Lebanese Communist Party. The UAR has long ago denied any knowledge of this matter. The other case is that of one Riad el Turk. The UAR did more than deny his killing; on 5 June he was allowed, alive and apparently in good health, to meet the press in a Damascus prison.

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crypto-Communist, who has been head of G-2 since the early days of the Castro government, and, as such, has been responsible for the introduction of police-state terrorism. Among other things, he is responsible for the wide-spread informant system. How thorough this system has become is graphically illustrated in the 2 June 1961 issue of Vision, a bi-weekly Spanish language magazine published in New York with hemisphere-wide circulation. Vision reproduced a copy of the printed form neighborhood informants are to fill out for the officials of the "Committee for the Defense of the Revolution." Informants are to list all packages going into and out of apartments in their neighborhoods, report on all young men who are not working and have no visible means of support, all gatherings of persons, all strange cars entering or leaving the neighborhood, all persons entering or leaving apartments at abnormal hours, and, of course, all conversations which reveal counter-revolutionary sentiments, and reactions of people in general to decisions and measures of the regime.

Finally, it should be noted that on the same day the new Ministry of Interior was created, a decree was issued closing all private and parochial schools in all parts of Cuba, and confiscating their property. Education, henceforth, will be completely controlled by the Communist-dominated Ministry of Education.



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25X16106 The United Nations, the Soviet Union, and the Neutral Countries

Background: It is no accident that, for newly independent nations, a key step in attaining sovereignty is, in practice, admission to the United Nations. In joining the UN, the new, small nations become the equals, in the General Assembly, of the largest world powers. Countries which could otherwise never make their voices heard can raise them with resonance in New York. The UN serves as protector and sounding board for emergent nationalities. The smaller countries have the most intense interest in a strong UN organization, able to defend their freedom under the rule of law; this has been shown by the experience of countries as differently oriented as South Korea (not itself a UN member), Iran, the UAR, Lebanon, and the Congo. Not countries like these, but certain larger powers, are apt to assert that the UN infringes on their rights.

Khrushchev cultivates neutral leaders and proposes or supports declarations on such issues as human rights and immediate independence for colonies -- although human rights are least respected in the Soviet bloc, and although the USSR has been absorbing, not freeing territories inhabited by other nationalities. Support for human rights declarations costs the Soviets nothing, while their Declaration on Colonialism (like their disarmament proposals) is designed to discredit moderate, reasoned leadership, and to create chaotic situations which their followers can exploit. (The USSR's real feelings on the subject of the sovereignty and equality of the small nations have been shown by the behavior of Khrushchev in the UN, and of his subordinates in approaching peoples over the heads of their governments. (See Guidance Items #301, #305, #354, #355 and #378).


When it comes down to concrete measures, however, the Soviets are usually at odds with the UN. They refuse to modify their position when opposed by UN majorities, and when defeated, they are very bad losers. A few examples from the Soviet record in the UN illustrate this: (1) the USSR refused to support UN action (which it could not veto because it had not anticipated Security Council action in a meeting which it boycotted) against Communist aggression in Korea, -- contrary to fact and in direct conflict with basic principles of the UN Charter with regard to collective security; 2) the USSR forcibly suppressed the revolt in Hungary in 1956 and has rejected since that time UN requests to send an investigation team or a UN representative into Hungary; 3) the USSR refused to support UN actions condemning Communist China's genocide against Tibet; 4) the USSR refused to assume its share of the financial burden for UN actions in the Congo, and more seriously, intervened unilaterally with war materiel and other support for the pro-Communist faction while at the same time actively attempting to sabotage all UN efforts to arbitrate disputes and to allow the establishment of a stable Congo government; 5) the USSR has long refused to assume its share of the financial obligations for the UN emergency force maintaining a neutral zone in the Middle East -- the Gaza Strip between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

In organizational matters, as distinct from substantive, there is an equally clear attempt by the USSR to block the UN and check its development. The most familiar display of Soviet organizational tactics is in the use of the veto. The USSR has vetoed measures in the Security Council 94 times in

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contrast to 7 for all of the other permanent members combined (none of which was cast by the US). The USSR has also: 1) launched a campaign against Secretary-General Trygve Lie, noted for his dedication to the principles of internationalism and neutrality, and forced him out of the UN in 1957; 2) unable to gather the 2/3's Assembly vote to pass some of its own ulterior proposals, developed a continuing program to marshal the 1/3 minority vote to prevent effective UN action on other proposals; 3) carried on a campaign of vilification against Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, charging him with violation of the very neutrality for which he is noted, after he steadfastly held to Security Council and Assembly instructions in the Congo; 4) proposed revision of the office of the Secretary-General to a triumvirate representing Communist, Western, and neutral blocs, with a built-in veto. This new veto would permit the Soviets to block the actual carrying-out of any course of action voted by UN members. As recently as 3 June, the Soviet delegation to the UN issued a violent statement attacking Hammarskjold, who had ventured to defend his office and his own position. The Soviet proposal for including neutral bloc representation is actually a clever attempt to enlist neutral support for weakening the UN, thus removing an obstacle to the unrestrained exercise of Soviet pressure tactics. Saying that there are no neutral men, Khrushchev is trying to remove all chances of mediating disputes, so that the rest of the world will have no other alternatives than those of surrender or war. As Chakravarthi Narasimban, Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs of the UN and an Indian national, put it, only those "among the big powers who feel that the influence of the Secretary General poses an obstacle to the unhampered pursuit of their political interests, would... continue to attack the institution itself." Thinking in terms of hostile blocs, the Soviets would replace all effective international organization with a rigid division into three sections -- actually two, since they calculate that the neutrals, once completely divorced from the west and deprived of UN protection, will be unable to maintain their independence from Moscow and Beijing.



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NUMBER 69

Briefly Noted

Soviet Criticism of Ilya Ehrenburg: In the June issue of the journal of the Russian Federation of Writers, Ilya Ehrenburg, the famous Soviet author, was criticized for assuming the "hopeless and historically doomed task of defending and restoring moribund and modernistic ideas. . . . My God. . . . to what extent has his capitulation to decadent esthetics reached?" While admitting that Ehrenburg had written a number of wonderful novels, stories and verse the article deplored the fact that "in recent years his opinions on esthetic questions have come to contradict the principles on which his best theses are based. . . . he has begun to justify modernistic views and tastes." The article also claimed that Ehrenburg "even tried to justify" Pasternak's withdrawal from the main stream of Soviet life.

Sentencing of Hungarian Church Officials: A 19 June communique from the Budapest Tribunal states that "on the basis of the confessions of the accused. . . . the Budapest Tribunal found Gesza Haves and his accomplices guilty of forming an organization to overthrow the Hungarian People's Republic. . . . They made preparations to change the internal order of Hungary and restore the bourgeois system. . . . to return the means of production to private owners and restore to the Church its former property. . . . They set up several illegal organizations, recruiting chiefly among the youth. They prepared and distributed a large amount of counter-revolutionary material and established several illegal duplicating and bookbinding shops. Sentences ranged from 2 1/2 to 12 years imprisonment and (according to Tass of 19 June) includes subsequent deprivation of civil rights and partial confiscation of property.

The trial constitutes the most aggressive anti-church manifestation in Hungary since the 1956 revolution and reflects the regime's increased confidence in its internal strength. It has been reported that other trials have recently taken place and that several priests have received prison sentences of 5 to 7 years.

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401 Nationalist Opposition Group in the Bulgarian Communist Party

Background: An editorial in the April issue of the party organ Partien Zhivot (Party Life) confirmed rumors that an opposition group had been discovered within the Bulgarian Communist Party. According to the article, Dobri Terpeshev and Yonko Panov, former BCP leaders who had been ousted for revisionist tendencies, were the ring leaders. Together with Nikola Kufardzhiev, the secretary of the Central Council of Trade Unions, they were accused of organizing "faithless and distrustful" party members who "gloated over difficulties" and who had "sold themselves to foreign agents." Although the editorial did not identify the "foreign agents", rumors have linked the group with Vladimir Sindjelic, Second Secretary of the Yugoslav legation at Sofia, who was declared persona non grata on 7 March. At that time, he was publicly charged with having attempted to make contacts with Bulgarian citizens and with denouncing the Bulgarian regime and its policies. It has also been reported that these groups wrote anonymous letters to members of the Central Committee, held conspiratorial meetings, contacted, briefed and attempted to recruit others, proposed the organization of strikes in Bulgarian industries, wrote pamphlets and appeals which were mailed to other party members and attempted to organize groups in Plovdiv and Sofia. Furthermore, the group was alleged to have addressed a letter to the Politburo in which it urged a basic change in policy and argued that the present party leaders have not been successful in eradicating Stalinism and that they are to blame for the serious economic failures. Currently, the Bulgarian regime is undertaking a reorganization of its party and government machinery, ostensibly to rectify administrative shortcomings, particularly in the management of the economy. Todor Prakhov, Chairman of the Central Committee of Trade Unions, has been fired and leaders in five of Bulgaria's 30 administrative districts have also been removed. In several other areas, party leaders have been severely criticized. The decision to air these shortcomings, many of which have existed for years, was probably forced on the regime by the case of the dissident group and by the latter's demanding a revision of Bulgaria's economic policies.

On 6 April the party first secretary in Pleven was fired, and it was recommended that the head of the People's Council also be dismissed; the charges were not specified. On 22 April the First Secretary in Dimitrovo was fired; on the same day Spas Rusinov, member of the Mikhaylovgrad party committee, was ousted for "incorrect methods of work" and for violations of "state and financial discipline" during the time, more than a year earlier, when he had been first secretary. A local paper revealed that some time in early May the party first secretary in Khaskovo District was ousted, and on 17 May, the Plovdiv District People's Council Chief, Nikola Stoilev, was fired "for having tolerated serious shortcomings and mistakes in work." Many of the individuals who have been purged may have been among the "doubters" who questioned the feasibility of the "leap forward" in the spring of 1959.

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By suggesting that the Yugoslavs are supporting the opposition groups, the Bulgarian regime may be attempting to play down dissension which is essentially internal. The regime's overly ambitious economic policies of 1959-60, have left the regime vulnerable to charges of unrealistic planning. Moreover, the administrative reorganizing and decentralization which accompanied these policies created widespread dissatisfaction among party members. The May issue of the party theoretical journal Novo Vreme (New Times) confirms speculations that the dissidents used Bulgaria's economic and administrative ills to argue for economic reforms. The Novo Vreme article and the regime's handling of Yugoslav diplomat Sindjelic, implied that the dissidents were oriented toward Yugoslav revisionist economic policies. The article also stated that the regime was obliged to defend its policies against attacks by those who supported Vulko Chervenkov, the Stalinist former party boss who was demoted in 1956 but who still holds high positions in the party.

The potentially disparate elements - "revisionists" as well as "hardliners" in the Bulgarian party may have interpreted the Moscow Declaration and the Albanian heresy as signs of a weakening of Moscow's control over the international Communist movement.

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
402. UNITED NATIONS: Khrushchev Proposes Moving UN Headquarters to

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Background: While in Vienna and immediately following his talks with President Kennedy, Chairman Khrushchev sounded out Austrian governmental officials on a proposal to move the UN from New York to Vienna. Chancellor Gornvach of Austria confirmed that Khrushchev had made this proposal and said that Austria would be happy if Russia and the United States would agree to move. Subsequently, however, Austrian officials have expressed themselves as being lukewarm toward the proposal and dubious over the ability of their country to cope with the problems that would be created. The Soviet approach in Vienna was apparently only a first step in a Soviet bloc campaign to build up pressures for removal of the UN Headquarters from New York. Among the African and Asian delegations now in New York the Soviets have begun to play up the problem of discrimination as a prime reason for moving the UN away from the United States. Similarly, the Nacvalac case and other incidents involving bloc diplomats have been cited as reasons for leaving a country which is unable to provide protection for foreign representatives and which does not respect diplomatic immunity.

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403. Exacerbation of Soviet-Albanian Relations

Background: During the last month, Albania has accelerated the process of weakening its ties with the Soviet Union and strengthening its bonds with the People's Republic of China. On 27 May an Albanian court condemned to death four defendants, including Vice Admiral Teme Sejko, who with nine others had been accused of plotting an armed uprising with the aid of the "Yugoslavs, Greeks and U. S. Sixth Fleet". In reality, the trial was directed against Khrushchev who, for the past year has been attempting to oust Hoxha and replace him and his cohorts with leaders responsive to Soviet control. Thus, despite its exotic billing, the trial actually was used as a vehicle for denouncing detente policies associated with Khrushchev. Sejko and three other defendants, were condemned to death and executed 31 May 1961. Soviet bloc reaction to the trial is interesting. With the exceptions of East Germany and Bulgaria - each of which referred to the trial briefly on one occasion - the Soviet Union and its satellites maintained a frozen silence on the proceedings at Tirana.

Now, Moscow has resorted to more direct methods in order to isolate her erring erstwhile satellite. In late May and early June, the Soviet Union began a withdrawal of its military personnel from Albania. The USSR appears also to be abandoning to Albania its Vlone military base. At the end of May the Albanian military attache in Moscow hastily departed for home possibly after having been expelled. Some of the satellites and Western CP's are apparently following Moscow's lead in their attitude toward Albania. For example, a Hungarian official was reported to have voiced concern over the developments in Albania and to have told an Albanian diplomat that Hungarian aid to Albania would be affected. The Italian Communist Party, which in April declined an invitation to an Albanian Trade Union meeting and postponed indefinitely a joint "peace partisans" meeting, also appears to be avoiding the Albanian comrades. With Poland, official contacts have been almost non-existent since the departure of the Albanian Minister to Poland in March. There are indications that Czechoslovakia has withdrawn credit for developing nickel extraction in Albania and the Chinese reportedly have promised to build a processing plant instead.

The Manchester Guardian of 9 June and the London Daily Telegraph of that date report on a violent speech delivered by Hoxha at the November conference of World Communist Parties in Moscow in which the latter accused Khrushchev of "brutal intervention" in Albania, stating that the USSR had put pressure on some of the Albanian leaders in an attempt to set them against the "rightful leadership" of the party. According to Mr. Hoxha, the Soviet Union delayed on a promised shipment of 5,000 tons of wheat so that "the Soviet rats could eat while the Albanian people were dying of hunger."

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Background: It was anticipated that the 20th anniversary of the Nazi attack on Russia would be the occasion for accusations against the Western nations and the West Germans. But the Soviets have given these accusations extra force in connection with Khrushchev's current drive against West Berlin, and this attack will probably grow still more strident and intensive over the summer. Khrushchev's militant 21 June speech centered on the idea that Britain and France had intended to "destroy the Soviet Union by the force of the Hitler military machine," and that even today "the aggressive imperialist circles of the West... would not be averse to trying this once more now if they found a force which they could push against the Soviet Union." Although Khrushchev refrained (probably in the interests of splitting NATO) from explicitly identifying the views of all Western leaders with those of the West German "revanchists," he clearly intended to draw an analogy between his conception of the situation in 1938-39 and his conception of that in 1961. Both conceptions are false, distorted interpretations super-imposed upon a minimum factual basis.

Both the Soviets and the Western powers erred in handling Hitler; the difference was that between the man who pays a gangster "protection" money (the West), and a second gangster who shares in dividing the loot (the Soviets). Soviet claims that the West plotted to turn Hitler on the USSR are ridiculous; Hitler could not attack the Soviets without crossing Poland and other East European countries, and Western opinion would never have permitted their governments to support such an attack. (Even Sir Horace Wilson and R. S. Hudson, who attempted last minute appeasement negotiations in the summer of 1939, never discussed the possibility of a Nazi attack on the USSR, and always insisted that the Germans must restore the confidence which had been shattered by the annexation of Czechoslovakia.) Khrushchev's history generally overlooks the role of Western opinion, which feared war, and dictated appeasement until Hitler's entry into Prague left no doubt of his aggressiveness. But the appearance of weakness was deceptive; Khrushchev also overlooks the force which British, American, and French (underground) opinion gave to the Western effort after the fall of France. (A fuller discussion of the 1939-1941 period is contained in an attachment to this guidance item.)

In his discussion of the war itself, Sovocentrically called the "Great Russian Patriotic War," Khrushchev makes light of the Western contribution, not mentioning that the British and American forces were engaged not only with Germany but also with Japan, whose forces numbered over 6,000,000. The Western and Chinese forces fought Japan for years in remote uncles, on beaches, and in roadless mountain areas. Soviet participation in the war against Japan lasted six days, 8 to 14 August 1945, beginning two days after the first atomic bomb was dropped at Hiroshima. Khrushchev is quite right in saying that Soviet losses were much greater than Western; they were also roughly three times greater than German losses on all fronts (See Guidance #318, 21 November 1960). Were all these deaths necessary, considering that the Red Army had 290

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divisions in 1939, and 21,000 tanks in 1941? (Although the Red Army had two models larger and more powerful than those of the Germans, 19,000 of these tanks had been wiped out by the end of the summer. The Germans had attacked with 3,000 tanks.) Such practices as suicide infantry charges through minefields to clear the way for armor help to explain the Soviet losses. As political deputy with the forces, Khrushchev himself played a role by ordering hopeless attacks at Kharkov in 1942.

The least factual part of Khrushchev's speech was his attack on Adenauer and the West German military leaders. Khrushchev states: "You (Adenauer) say that if we sign a peace treaty with the GDR you will stop at nothing." Adenauer never said anything of the kind. His strongest recent statement was that made on 11 June, in connection with the Soviet proposal that the East and West Germans should negotiate a treaty between them; Adenauer said: "This demand we will never accept." His position on a possible East-German-Soviet peace treaty is the same as that of the other NATO powers: they cannot prevent such an action. The defense of British, French, and American occupation rights in West Berlin is another matter, but it concerns those powers and not West Germany. Khrushchev, however, has responded to this threat which Adenauer never made by saying that it will mean suicide for West Germany. Just as Khrushchev seems to be the real source of threats he also appears to be the real revanchist. He says that the new frontiers of Germany have "restored historical justice which was violated by the forefathers of the present German militarists." This apparently means that the Soviet Union has won just revenge for the aggressions of the Teutonic Knights in the 12th to 14th centuries. Khrushchev also stresses the war guilt of the German military caste, never mentioning the Soviet assistance to General von Seeckt in evading the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Versailles in the 1920's. But whatever the faults of the Wehrmacht leaders, and they were many, the fact remains that this group (and allied civilian conservatives) furnished the only element in Germany, Communists not excepted, to attempt to remove Hitler. The honorable role of the July 1944 plotters contrasts vividly with Khrushchev's own spineless submission under Stalin.

The recent history of militarism in Germany is as follows: In July 1948 the "Barracked People's Police" (KVP) was organized in East Germany. A year later its strength had reached 48,000 and, in 1950, 55,000. In 1951 the KVP received tanks, howitzers, and anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. Unlike the ordinary civil police ("People's Police"), they proved loyal to the regime when the East German people revolted on 17 June 1953. In November 1955 all wraps were taken off and the KVP became the "National People's Army" (NVA). This dropping of the mask was possible because the first 101 members of the West German Bundeswehr, which had no disguised antecedents, received their uniforms that month; it could be claimed in East Berlin that Bonn was the first to have an army. By 1960, the Bundeswehr army had 160,000 men, the NVA 71,000. However, the former were mainly conscripts serving one year only. The NVA members were largely pre-trained in a paramilitary organization, the "Society for Sport and Skill" (GST). Actually, the East German military strength was doubled through such other organizations as the Border Police, the Alert

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Police, the Transport Police, and the Guard Units. Moreover, there are party-controlled, factory-based Battle Groups (Kampfgruppen), providing organized militia, somewhat on the Chinese model.

The Berlin crisis does indeed recall the situation on the eve of World War II. Communist charges of West German "provocation" in inciting defections, holding government and refugee meetings in West Berlin, etc. recall Ribbentrop's charges to the Polish Ambassador that Poland had adopted a "peculiar attitude" in the League of Nations Minorities Commission, that Polish students had provoked incidents in Danzig, that there had been anti-German demonstrations in Warsaw, and that there was an "open press feud" with Germany. Khrushchev says that Berlin is "a bone in the throat" that has to be removed; Hitler said, "In the case of Danzig and the Corridor I have again tried to solve the problems by proposing peaceful discussions. One thing was obvious: they had to be solved. That the date of the solution may perhaps be of little interest to the Western Powers is conceivable. But this date is not a matter of indifference to us." After these problems had been solved, Hitler said, the relationship with Poland could be changed to one of "peaceful coexistence" (his words). As the Soviets try to do now, the Nazis tried to make the Western allies feel that Poland's attitude was suicidal and fanatic, and therefore that there could be no obligation to her: Weizsacker told the French Ambassador: "...it was inconceivable that France or Great Britain would be willing to stake their existence in favor of their friend who had run amok," and he told the British Ambassador that "Germany believed that the attitude of the Poles would be or was such as to free the British Government from any obligation to follow blindly every eccentric step on the part of a lunatic." Khrushchev should note 25X1C10b that the Nazi tactics did not prevent the West from going to war.

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Background: Although, for purposes of propaganda, the Communists profess an interest in the possibility of setting up controlling bodies as a means of preventing certain actions which might lead to open conflict in various parts of the world, they have, in every case, evolved a carefully worked out system which, in effect, would nullify whatever capability such bodies may have to take independent action in any given situation. They intend to achieve this by insisting upon tripartite membership within the control body (1 Communist bloc member, 1 free world member and 1 neutral) with each member having veto power over the other two.

In the case of the International Control Commission for Laos, the Communists have twice reversed their position to accommodate their current strategic plans. The original ICC in Laos served the Communists well until its withdrawal at the request of the Royal Government in July-August 1958. Consequently, comments and propaganda from that time until May 1961 emphasized demands for the return of the ICC to Laos. However, when it became apparent that the Western powers were willing to have the ICC return, but also planned to strengthen its authority to investigate reported cease-fire violations and to make it, in fact, an effective body, the Communist position changed to use delaying tactics to prevent the ICC's return. Thus, it was only at the insistence of the Western powers that the Communists agreed to reconvene the ICC. Following its arrival in Vientiane, the ICC declared that the opposing sides had ordered their forces to observe a cease-fire. Using this statement, and in the face of proof to the contrary, the Communists have repeatedly claimed that the Pathet Lao/Kong Le forces are observing the cease-fire and are being attacked by the Royal Government troops. At the same time, they have opposed all suggestions that the ICC investigate these alleged violations. When the Royal Laotian Government furnishes uncontested proof of continued Pathet Lao/Viet Minh aggression against RLG positions, as was the case at Ban Pa Dong, the Communists justify their actions by claiming that they were merely reoccupying positions held by them prior to the cease-fire declaration and, in consequence this does not represent any breach of the cease-fire declaration.

When suggestions are made, as they were by the French and Canadian delegates to the Geneva Conference, that the International Control Commission be provided with both the authority and the means of investigating violations of the cease-fire and of enforcing same, the Communists once again get around this subject by claiming that any useful action which the ICC could carry out in Laos might risk infringing on the independence and sovereignty of the



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ADDENDUM

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Item #404 - See Attachment entitled "Nazi-Soviet Relations (1939-1941)". Suggested Material for this item follows:

Documents:

Germany. Auswartiges Amt. Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941. Washington, 1948.

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Churchill, W. S. The Second World War. 6 volumes. 1948-53.

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Clay, L. D. Decision in Germany. 1950. (Postwar)



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Feis, H. Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: the War They Waged and the Peace They Sought. 1957.

Hilger, G. and Meyer, A. G. The Incompatible Allies: Soviet Relations, 1918-1941. 1953.

Langer, W. L. and Gleason, E. The Challenge of Isolation, 1937-1940 and The Undeclared War, 1940-1941. 1953.

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Shirer, W. L. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. 1960.

Some of the English-language books cited above have been translated into other languages. Ciano's Diario has been translated into English.

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NAZI-SOVIET RELATIONS1939-1941

In spite of Soviet assertions, and notwithstanding a tremendous mass of documentary and memoir information from German as well as Western sources, no serious evidence supports the charge that the Western powers planned to incite Hitler to attack the USSR. It is true that Neville Chamberlain, the most important Western leader of 1938-39, was very suspicious of Moscow, and that (unlike Churchill) he was reluctant to enter into an alliance with the Soviet Union. Chamberlain once stated: "I can't believe that she (Russia) has the same aims and objects as we have, or any sympathy with Democracy as such. She is afraid of Germany and Japan and would be delighted to see other people fight them." His dominant motivation, however, was an intense fear of any world war, and consequently he seized on every possible opportunity to avoid it. He did not think in terms of inevitable conflict, or even (unfortunately) of a balance of power; he was not, as the Communists were, power-minded in his approach to diplomacy. Instead, he hoped to reach an agreement between "reasonable men" which would preserve the status quo. This was, of course, quite the wrong way to approach Hitler, but it was a far cry from using the forces of the Reich to destroy the Bolshevist state. It may be hard for the Kremlin to realize it, but the USSR was simply not then the dominant preoccupation of Western leaders.

There were two elements in the pre-World War II situation which are often overlooked today, especially by Soviet propaganda. One was that Hitler was able (like Khrushchev today) to advance certain arguments for his foreign policy claims. Rearmament was justified as "equality", the reoccupied Rhineland was German territory, Austria had sought Anschluss between 1918 and 1933, and most of the Sudeten people spoke German. The British and other Western powers did not feel that there was a strong case against Hitler's foreign policy until the annexation of the rump Czech state on 15 March 1939. From then on, the British acted to guarantee Poland and to try to build up an alliance to support what was left of the East European status quo. In retrospect, this action was belated; democratic governments, because they depend on popular support, are often influenced by plausible arguments rather than by the rules of power politics. This misleads power-oriented dictators, who make two different serious errors: they think the democracies are playing some deep and devious game, or that they lack determination and will. Hitler made the latter mistake, and Khrushchev seems to be making both of them simultaneously. In regard to the second error, it has been shown that once the people of a democracy do become thoroughly aroused, they become very belligerent, and they will tend to press on until their enemies are completely defeated; their warlike momentum may prevent them from considering a negotiated peace, which might in some cases be a more reasonable solution.

The other forgotten factor of the thirties was that there was then a whole row of independent nations between Germany and the USSR, of which Poland was the most important. The West could not have encouraged Hitler to attack the Soviet Union without sacrificing these countries, and after Czechoslovakia fell, Western opinion would not tolerate any further sacrifice. This is why there was never any real possibility of a deal with Hitler to annihilate the USSR. On the other hand, these countries had all good ideas of Soviet intentions, and they and Western opinion would not allow the Soviet Union to move Soviet forces into their countries. If the Western governments had not respected the refusal of the Polish government to permit the entry of Soviet troops, they would have sacrificed their whole political position of protecting Eastern Europe against aggression.

When it became apparent in August 1939 that the Western powers could not reach agreement with the Soviet Union, Stalin might have declared himself neutral. This might conceivably have made Hitler hesitate to attack Poland, not knowing what would follow. But instead, Stalin proceeded to conclude a "non-aggression" pact with the Fuehrer. Negotiations towards this had actually begun, at least half-initiated by Moscow, after the Nazis entered Prague on 15 March; indeed, Stalin, in a speech as early as 10 March, had been more abusive about the "so-called democracies" than about the "Fascist aggressors." The non-aggression pact announced on 21 August was distinguished from previous Soviet

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non-aggression pacts by the fact that there was no provision for denunciation in case one of the parties attacked a third nation, and by the unusual provision that the treaty would enter into force as soon as it was signed, i. e., before ratification. In other words, Stalin knew that there would be an immediate attack on Poland. Although Molotov asserted in a speech that there was no more in the pact "than is written in it," a Secret Additional Protocol assured the Soviets a share in the Baltic states, in Poland, and in Rumania, shares which they have retained and increased since the war. Captured German documents show that it was the USSR that proposed and wanted the secret deal. The Soviet share in these territories was their quid pro quo for giving Hitler what is considered the goal of German diplomacy, a situation in which he could wage a one-front war.

One cannot help but conclude that Stalin not only gained territory, but also thought Hitler a congenial ally, and the new line seems to have been a welcome change from the fruitless pretenses of the Popular Front. During the 1920's there had been close cooperation between the Soviet government and the head of the Reichswehr, General von Seeckt, and for ten years German officers were trained with planes and tanks on Soviet territory, beyond the reach of Allied inspection. Such German military figures as General von Blomberg, General Freiherr von Hammerstein, the Ritter von Niedermayer, and an aide of Ludendorff, Major Tschunke, spent prolonged periods in the Soviet Union. Some of this activity leaked out at the time, as in the Muenchner Post of 19 Jan 1927. The closeness of the relationship in 1939-41 is revealed again in recently published German documents. The Soviet Union gave the German Navy valuable support in their campaign against British shipping by providing a base on the Murmansk coast. On 6 September 1940, after the Germans had obtained other bases through the conquest of Norway, Berlin sent a message to Moscow instructing the German Embassy to convey the thanks of the Reich Government. On 9 September the Embassy reported Molotov's "satisfaction that we (the Nazis) had found useful the base placed at our disposal." Soviet material support flowed to Germany, the German Embassy reporting on 28 November 1940 that "Molotov's proposal (for material assistance) considerably exceeds our expectations," and 4 January 1941, "Mikoyan's statements today... were characterized by great cooperation and... the raw material delivery proposed by Mikoyan represents a valuable supplement to the economic agreement in a most important area." In January 1941, the partners concluded trade agreements which provided the Nazis not only with grain but also with strategic materials such as copper, tin, nickel, tungsten, and molybdenum. A veteran German economic diplomat, Karl Ritter, called those agreements "the biggest economic treaty complex that has ever been concluded between two states." When Molotov gave a reception on 2 November 1940, the German Ambassador, Count von der Schulenburg, "and the representatives of England and France and other countries" were placed at side tables. The Soviet Union was prepared to sign a treaty with the three Axis powers, carving up Asia and Africa between them. Germany was to center her "territorial aspirations" in Central Africa, Italy was to get North and Northeast Africa, Japan would expand southward to Eastern Asia, while for Stalin, there was to be staking out a sphere of influence south of the Soviet Union "in the direction of the Indian Ocean." On 26 November 1940, Molotov demanded that the treaty also provide for the withdrawal of German troops from Finland, for a Soviet-Bulgarian "mutual assistance" pact, and for a renunciation of Japanese rights in Northern Sakhalin, and the effect of this demand, especially that part of it which would have given Bulgaria to the USSR, was to make Hitler order "Operation Barbarossa" on 22 December 1940. While Hitler's impatience and megalomania were no doubt the basic reason for the attack, he might have waited until England was defeated if it had not been for Soviet greed and blackmail tactics. Stalin did not realize at first that he had ruffled his fellow-dictator. When indications became too strong to be entirely ignored, Molotov was replaced as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars by Stalin himself, evidently on the theory that he had been the irritant; Tass issued denials of troop concentrations and of strained relations; and the Embassies of Belgium, Norway, and

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Yugoslavia were closed. Deliveries under the trade agreements continued to be faithfully executed, at least from the Soviet side. Until the last moment, Stalin questioned the truth of all reports that Hitler would actually attack, preferring to believe in Hitler rather than in Churchill. Even when the attack began -- as Khrushchev disclosed in his secret speech in February 1956 -- Stalin judged that this was provocative action by "undisciplined sections of the German army." In other words, he could not really believe that Adolf would do this. Khrushchev now says that the Soviet government realized that, in concluding the non-aggression pact, "it was striking a deal with the devil incarnate." But this was not the way Stalin looked at the matter. For him it was, instead, a way of sharing the spoils, of joining the side of Power.